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untanglingwebs
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The Flint Genesee Chamber of Commerce is the Procurement Technical Assistance Center (PTAC) for Genesee and Shiawasee counties.
PTACs of Michigan
The Procurement Technical Assistance Centers (PTACs) of Michigan are not-for-profit organizations made up of 11 offices located throughout the state. Our mission is to enhance national defense and economic development in the State of Michigan by assisting Michigan businesses in obtaining and performing on federal, state and local government contracts. Through our seminars, events, training and consultations, we work to help local businesses succeed in the government marketplace.
The PTACs support our national security by ensuring a broad base of capable suppliers for the defense industry and other agencies, thereby increasing competition, which supports better products and services at lower costs. We are funded by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC) and local funding partners. |
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Fri Mar 21, 2014 7:28 am |
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untanglingwebs
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lint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce PTAC Hosts Contractor Bond Webinar
(FLINT, MICH) Are you a contractor looking to grow through government contracting? Then consider joining the Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce Procurement Technical Assistance Center (PTAC) as they host a webinar to help general contractors learn about surety bonds. On May 7, the Surety Bonds for General Contractors webinar will take place from 1:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. IBCS Fidelity, Inc. will facilitate the webinar, which is geared toward general and sub-contractors.
Dustin Frigy, Director of PTAC for the Chamber says that contractors will not be able to benefit from the more than $500 billion available in government contracting without the proper bonds. General contractors need performance and payment bonds when seeking government contracts and subcontractors need bonds to satisfy the general contractor’s requirements.
“To prepare for the upcoming construction season contractors will need appropriate bonds in place,” said Frigy. “This webinar provides the nuts and bolts necessary to take advantage of opportunities with the local, state and federal government. Contractors looking to grow, should definitely participate.”
Webinar participants will learn about the bond process, including:
Bonding 101 – The Key to Public Contracts
Why Bonds are Needed
The Underwriting Process
An Overview of the Surety Market
Application Process – How to Qualify for Support
Common Problems – Creative Solutions
There is no cost to participate, however registration is required.
To register for the webinar or for more information contact Chelsea Schutz at (810) 600-1437 or ptac@flintandgenesee.org.
About the Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce
The Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce (flintandgenesee.org) is one of the Top 10 largest chambers in Michigan based on revenue and number of members. We are the voice of business and community advocacy in Flint & Genesee. The Chamber is over 100 years old, was established before the Michigan Chamber of Commerce and is a founding member of the United States Chamber of Commerce.
Two words describe the Chamber as it enters its second century of service: collaboration and partnership. It is our goal to work with government, business, education, nonprofit organizations and consumers to support the growth and development of the community economically, culturally and socially. |
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Fri Mar 21, 2014 5:21 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce PTAC Hosts Navigating Government Bids Workshop
Next Step in the 5-Part Certification Series
PTAC(FLINT, MICHIGAN) Do you know how to identify the right government bids for your company? Are you interested in learning the best ways to respond to government bid opportunities? Then you should join the Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce Procurement Technical Assistance Center (PTAC) as they host a Navigating Bid Opportunities 2.0 workshop. The workshop takes place on Wednesday, April 24 from 1:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. at the Grand Blanc City Hall in Grand Blanc.
According to Dustin Frigy, Director of PTAC for the Chamber understanding the bid process is the first step in winning government contracts. He says businesses should explore the ways government contracting can increase growth and diversification. The Navigating Bid Opportunities workshop is the next step in a five-part certification series designed to help businesses work with government departments.
“Working with the government can provide growth opportunities for local businesses,” said Frigy. “Learning to navigate the maize of government contracting can be challenging. That’s why businesses should take advantage of the opportunity to learn the nuts and bolts of government contracting. This workshop is the latest part of our 5-Part Government Contracting Certification process created to provide businesses with strategies for success in government contracting.”
The next workshops in the series include:
May 15 State Contract Opportunities 3.0
May 22 Preparing a State Proposal 4.0
June 12 Flint & Genesee Contract Opportunities 5.0
Attendees also will learn about the services and support the Chamber PTAC has available to help with the contracting process. The series will benefit management and employees who currently support or have an interest in facilitating government contracting within their companies.
There is no cost to participate in the series, but registration is required. The Grand Blanc City Hall is located at 203 E. Grand Blanc Road.
To register for the webinar and/or the series or for more information contact Chelsea Schutz at (810) 600-1437 or email ptac@flintandgenesee.org.
About the Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce
The Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce (www.flintandgenesee.org) is one of the Top 10 largest chambers in Michigan. We are the voice of business and community advocacy in Genesee County. The Chamber is over 100 years old, was established before the Michigan Chamber of Commerce and is a founding member of the United States Chamber of Commerce. |
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Fri Mar 21, 2014 5:29 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Chapter 8: Ethics - Michigan Municipal League
Public office is a public trust. .... The chamber of commerce later proposes that the chamber and the city enter into a ... or more “incompatible offices” at the same.
www.mml.org/pdf/glv/chapter8.pdf |
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Fri Mar 21, 2014 6:27 pm |
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1968 PA 317 - Michigan Legislature - Home
www.legislature.mi.gov/(ydwzt4biwufoo245l1snaeez)/mileg.aspx?page...
The Michigan Legislature Website is a free service of the Legislative Internet Technology Team in cooperation with the Michigan Legislative Council, the Michigan ...
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[PDF]
Michigan laws of interest to municipalities
www.mml.org/pdf/hmo/28.pdf
lic Entities Act, 1968 PA 317, as amended, ... • Housing Law of Michigan, 1917 PA 167, as amended, MCL 125.401 et seq. Promotes health, safety and welfare by
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Related searches for michigan 1968 PA 317
Michigan PA School
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Legislative Council, State of Michigan Courtesy of www ...
www.legislature.mi.gov/.../documents/mcl/pdf/mcl-Act-317-of-1968.pdf
Act 317 of 1968 AN ACT relating to ... Rendered Monday, February 10, 2014 Page 1 Michigan Compiled Laws Complete Through PA 3 of 2014 Legislative Council, ...
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Opinion #6906
www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/datafiles/1990s/op06906.htm
Opinion No. 6906. June 25, 1996. CONFLICT OF INTEREST: Application of 1968 PA 317 to members of county boards of commissioners, city councils and township boards |
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Sat Mar 22, 2014 2:24 pm |
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
Opinion No. 6906
June 25, 1996
CONFLICT OF INTEREST:
Application of 1968 PA 317 to members of county boards of commissioners, city councils and township boards
CONFLICT OF INTEREST:
1968 PA 317 as the sole law regarding conflicts of interest arising out of public contracts involving public servants
CONFLICT OF INTEREST:
The extent to which 1968 PA 317 supersedes sections 30 and 31 of 1851 PA 156
1968 PA 317 applies to members of county boards of commissioners, city councils, township boards, and members of any other public bodies that county boards of commissioners, city councils and township boards may establish by law.
The Legislature intended that 1968 PA 317 constitute the sole law regarding conflicts of interest arising out of public contracts involving public servants.
1968 PA 317 supersedes section 30 of 1851 PA 156 to the extent that section 30 deals with conflicts of interest arising out of public contracts, and 1968 PA 317 only supersedes section 31 of 1851 PA 156 to the extent that section 31 could penalize a county commissioner for a conflict of interest arising out of a public contract.
Honorable Allen Lowe
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, Michigan 48913
You have asked three questions regarding the statute governing conflicts of interest arising out of contracts between public servants and public entities, 1968 PA 317, MCL 15.321 et seq; MSA 4.1700(51) et seq. Section 2 of 1968 PA 317 generally prohibits public servants from being interested in, soliciting, negotiating or approving contracts with the public entity they serve. Sections 3, 3a and 4 of the statute then create some exceptions to that general rule.
You first ask whether 1968 PA 317 applies to members of county boards of commissioners, city councils, township boards, and members of any other public bodies that county boards of commissioners, city councils and township boards may establish by law. Section 1(a) of 1968 PA 317 defines "public servant" as follows:
"Public servant" includes all persons serving any public entity, except members of the legislature and state officers who are within the provisions of section 10 of article 4 of the state constitution as implemented by legislative act. [Emphasis added.]
Section 1(b) of 1968 PA 317, in turn, defines "public entity" as follows:
"Public entity" means the state including all agencies thereof, any public body corporate within the state, including all agencies thereof, or any non-incorporated public body within the state of whatever nature, including all agencies thereof.
These definitions are very broad, and clearly cover officers and employees of all public bodies, with the exception of members of the Legislature and state officers who fall within the purview of Const 1963, art 4, s 10, and its implementing legislation, 1968 PA 318, MCL 15.301 et seq; MSA 4.1700(21) et seq. Accordingly, both the courts of this state and this office have applied 1968 PA 317 to various local officials. See, e.g., Van Buren Twp v Ackron, 63 Mich App 600; 234 NW2d 722 (1975); OAG, 1979-1980, No 5685, p 703 (April 9, 1980); OAG, 1985-1986, No 6276, p 26 (March 1, 1985); OAG, 1989-1990, No 6563, p 27 (January 26, 1989).
It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your first question, that 1968 PA 317 applies to members of county boards of commissioners, city councils, township boards, and members of any other public bodies that county boards of commissioners, city councils and township boards may establish by law. (1)
You next ask whether the Legislature intended that 1968 PA 317 constitute the sole law regarding conflicts of interest arising out of public contracts involving public servants. The answer to your second question is found in section 8 of 1968 PA 317, which states:
This act shall supersede all local charter provisions, whether incorporated in legislative acts or local charters, which relate to the matter of conflict of interest. It is the intention that this act shall constitute the sole law in this state and shall supersede all other acts in respect to conflicts of interest relative to public contracts, involving public servants other than members of the legislature and state officers, including but not limited to subsection (3) of section 30 of Act No. 156 of the Public Acts of 1851, as amended, being section 46.30 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. [Emphasis added].
Thus, the Legislature has clearly stated its intent that 1968 PA 317 "shall constitute the sole law in this state and shall supersede all other acts in respect to conflicts of interest relative to public contracts involving public servants."
It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your second question, that the Legislature intended that 1968 PA 317 constitute the sole law regarding conflicts of interest arising out of public contracts involving public servants.
Your third question is whether 1968 PA 317 supersedes sections 30 and 31 of the statute governing county boards of commissioners, 1851 PA 156, MCL 46.1 et seq; MSA 5.321 et seq. Since section 30 of 1851 PA 156 is specifically mentioned in section 8 of 1968 PA 317, the effect of that section on section 30 will be addressed first.
As noted above, section 8 of 1968 PA 317 specifies that the act supersedes "subsection (3) of section 30 of Act No. 156 of the Public Acts of 1851." When 1968 PA 317 was enacted, subsection (3) of section 30 of 1851 PA 156 provided:
No member of such [county board of commissioners] shall be interested directly or indirectly in any contract or other business transaction with any such county, or any board, office or commission thereof, during the time for which he is elected or appointed, nor for one year thereafter unless such contract or transaction has been approved by 3/4 of the members of the [county board of commissioners] and so shown on the minutes of the board together with a showing that the board is cognizant of such member's interest. This prohibition is not intended to apply to appointments or employment by the county, or its officers, boards, committees, or other authority, which appointments and employment shall be governed by the provisions of section 30a of this act. [Emphasis added.]
The answer to your question is further complicated, however, by the fact that, seven years after the passage of 1968 PA 317, the Legislature amended section 30 of 1851 PA 156 by 1975 PA 206. By this amendment, the Legislative eliminated every subsection of section 30 except subsection (3), which then became the whole of section 30. Thus, the Legislature rewrote section 30 to include only the language that was supposedly superseded by 1968 PA 317. Arguably, this change may evidence a legislative intent that section 30 be a viable provision as to contractual conflicts of interest involving county commissioners.
Unfortunately, the legislative history of 1975 PA 206 provides little guidance as to the Legislature's intent in eliminating all of section 30 of 1851 PA 156 except that portion already superseded by 1968 PA 317. As 1975 PA 206 was originally introduced (as HB 4811), and as it originally passed the House of Representatives, it only amended section 11 of 1851 PA 156 and added section 11b to that statute. 1975 Journal of the House 844. HB 4811 was amended in the Senate to include language amending section 30. 1975 Journal of the Senate 1777, 1791, 1830. The only legislative analysis of HB 4811 was written prior to the amendments made in the Senate, and merely discusses the addition of section 11b, allowing county boards of commissioners to enter into installment contracts for the purchase of land, property or equipment. House Legislative Analysis, HB 4811, June 5, 1975. Thus, there is insufficient evidence of the Legislature's intent in amending section 30 of 1851 PA 156 to warrant a conclusion that the Legislature intended to render the superseded language of section 30(3) viable, contrary to the clear expression of legislative intent found in section 8 of 1968 PA 317 that there be statewide uniformity in the statutory rules concerning contractual conflicts of interest involving public servants.
In addition, whatever the Legislature's purpose in leaving the language of subsection (3) of section 30 intact while eliminating the remainder of section 30, the fact remains that the Legislature made no changes whatsoever to the language of subsection (3). The Legislature has established numerous rules of statutory construction in MCL 8.3 et seq; MSA 2.212 et seq. In particular, MCL 8.3u; MSA 2.212(21) reads as follows:
The provisions of any law or statute which is re-enacted, amended or revised, so far as they are the same as those of prior laws, shall be construed as a continuation of such laws and not as new enactments.
Thus, since the language of subsection (3) of section 30 of 1851 PA 156 remained unchanged by 1975 PA 206, section 30, as it now exists, should not be considered a new enactment. Since section 30 is merely a continuation of section 30(3) as it existed at the time of the enactment of 1968 PA 317, that statute supersedes section 30 just as it superseded section 30(3).
It should also be noted that, in addition to covering conflicts of interest arising out of public contracts, section 30 of 1851 PA 156 covers conflicts of interest arising out of "other business transaction[s]." In expressly indicating the Legislature's intent that 1968 PA 317 supersede what is now section 30 of 1851 PA 156, section 8 of 1968 PA 317 states generally that the act supersedes "all other acts in respect to conflicts of interest relative to public contracts." (Emphasis added.) Thus, there is a question whether 1968 PA 317 supersedes section 30 completely, or only to the extent that section 30 governs conflicts of interest arising out of contracts.
The rules of statutory construction governing implied repeals of statutes is helpful in analyzing this situation. Generally, the courts of this state are reluctant to find that a statute has been repealed by implication, but will do so in two instances: (1) when a subsequent legislative act conflicts with a prior act; or (2) when a subsequent act is intended to occupy the entire field covered by a prior act. House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 561-563; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). Applying a similar standard to determine whether the Legislature intended that 1968 PA 317 supersede section 30 of 1851 PA 156 in its entirety requires that we examine whether the two statutes conflict with regard to non-contractual conflicts of interest and whether 1968 PA 317 occupies the entire field covered by section 30 of 1851 PA 156.
As 1968 PA 317 was originally written, it clearly applied only to conflicts of interest arising out of public contracts. Through 1982 PA 207, however, the Legislature added subsection (2) to section 3 of 1968 PA 317 to read, (2) in pertinent part, as follows:
This section and section 2 shall not prevent a public servant from making or participating in making a governmental decision to the extent that the public servant's participation is required by law. ... As used in this subsection, "governmental decision" means a determination, action, vote, or disposition upon a motion, proposal, recommendation, resolution, ordinance, order, or measure on which a vote by members of a local legislative or governing body of a public entity is required and by which a public body effectuates or formulates public policy. [Emphasis added].
In a Letter Opinion of the Attorney General to Senator Robert Young dated August 12, 1982, this office noted that the addition of the reference to "governmental decisions" in section 3(2) might have violated the title-object clause of Const 1963, art 4, s 24, since the title of 1968 PA 317 only referred to contracts and not to other governmental decisions. Subsequently, the Legislature passed 1984 PA 81, which amended the title of 1968 PA 317 to read: "[a]n act relating to the conduct of public servants in respect to governmental decisions and contracts with public entities." (Emphasis added.)
Do these amendments to 1968 PA 317 indicate that the act covers both contractual and non-contractual conflicts of interest? The answer is no, since 1968 PA 317 still contains no language prohibiting conflicts of interest arising out of non-contractual decisions. Since section 30 of 1851 PA 156 does expressly prohibit members of the county board of commissioners from being directly or indirectly interested in "business transactions" other than contracts, the two acts are not really in conflict on this issue.
Thus, 1968 PA 317 conflicts with section 30 of 1851 PA 156 only to the extent that both deal with conflicts of interest arising out of public contracts. In addition, despite the reference to "governmental decisions" in the title and section 3(3) of 1968 PA 317, section 8 of the act contains no reference to "governmental decision" and says only that the act constitutes the sole law of this state with respect to conflicts of interest regarding public contracts. Accordingly, there is no basis to infer a legislative intent that 1968 PA 317 occupy the entire field of non-contractual conflicts of interest. Therefore, 1968 PA 317 does not supersede section 30 of 1851 PA 156 to the extent that section 30 covers non-contractual conflicts of interest.
You have also asked whether 1968 PA 317 supersedes section 31 of 1851 PA 156. Section 31(1) (3) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[I]f a member of the county board of commissioners neglects or refuses to perform the duties which are required of the member by law, without just cause, the member shall for each offense forfeit $100.00.
Research has failed to reveal any authority applying section 31(1) to violations of the conflict of interest prohibitions of section 30. Nonetheless, section 31(1) could apply to violations of section 30, if section 30 is construed as imposing a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. To the extent that section 31 could penalize a county commissioner for a conflict of interest arising out of a public contract, 1968 PA 317 supersedes section 31. Otherwise, section 31 remains a viable provision unaffected by 1968 PA 317.
It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to your third question, that 1968 PA 317 supersedes section 30 of 1851 PA 156 to the extent that section 30 deals with conflicts of interest arising out of public contracts, and that 1968 PA 317 only supersedes section 31 of 1851 PA 156 to the extent that section 31 could penalize a county commissioner for a conflict of interest arising out of a public contract.
Frank J. Kelley
Attorney General
(1) Your opinion request refers to other public bodies that county boards of commissioners, city councils and township boards may establish by law. The request does not identify any of these other public bodies. This opinion only concludes that to the extent, if any, that these three local units of government have the authority to create other public bodies with the authority to enter into contacts, then the members of those other public bodies would also be subject to 1968 PA 317.
(2) Under the amendment of 1968 PA 317 by 1984 PA 184, the language of subsection (2) of section 3 was later placed in subsection (3).
(3) The other subsections of section 31 are clearly unaffected by 1968 PA 317, since subsections (2) and (3) specifically address violations of provisions regarding open meetings and public records, not conflicts of interest.
http://opinion/datafiles/1990s/op06906.htm
State of Michigan, Department of Attorney General
Last Updated 11/10/2008 16:49:34 |
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Sat Mar 22, 2014 2:27 pm |
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
Opinion No. 6005
November 2, 1981
CONFLICT OF INTEREST:
Members of a city council who are employees of a corporation seeking quasi-judicial decisions of the council
OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, p 64 (March 17, 1981), holding that members of a public body possessing quasi-judicial authority may not act upon matters submitted by a corporation which also employs them, applies generally to municipal public bodies exercising quasi-judicial authority.
A member of a city council who is employed by a corporation seeking specific quasi-judicial action from the city council is in a conflict of interest and may not participate in, nor vote upon, such official action.
The rule of necessity may not be applied to permit disqualified members of a city council to participate or be counted for quorum purposes in quasi-judicial municipal action requested by a corporation employing them.
Honorable Michael D. Hayes
State Representative
Capitol Building
Lansing, Michigan
Honorable Robert D. Young
State Senator
Capitol Building
Lansing, Michigan
On behalf of the city attorney for the City of Midland, you have requested my opinion on four questions pertaining to OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, p 64 (March 17, 1981). OAG, No 5864, supra, concluded that a temporary member of the State Site Approval Board created pursuant to the Hazardous Waste Management Act, 1979 PA 64; MCLA 299.501 et seq; MSA 13.30(1) et seq, who is employed by the applicant for a hazardous waste disposal facility construction permit is in conflict of interest and must resign, permitting a new temporary member to be appointed so that a duly constituted nine member State Site Approval Board may be convened.
As stated in the city attorney's letter to you, the Dow Chemical Company and Down Corning Corporation, located in the City of Midland, each maintain a large work force and many of their workers reside within the city. 'As a consequence of the foregoing, and as you might expect, many of these individuals are actively engaged in civil and governmental affairs and in all facets of life in the city.' At the present time, employees of the Dow Chemical Company constitute three members of the five-member city council.
The four questions which have been directed to me may be phrased as follows:
(1) Is OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, limited to the Site Approval Board for the hazardous waste facility proposed to be constructed in the City of Midland, or does the opinion have general application to the subject of conflict of interest?
In response to your first question, the factual setting in OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, involved a state site approval board convened pursuant to 1979 PA 64, supra, Sec. 17. Thus, the holding in OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, is particularly applicable in all instances where a site approval board is convened in Michigan under 1979 PA 64, supra.
The principles pertaining to conflict of interest, as discussed in OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, flow from two essential sources: statutory provisions and the common law as articulated by the courts. In both instances, evolving concepts of public policy play a prominent role.
A. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 10, stating that no member of the Legislature nor any state officer shall be directly or indirectly interested in any contract with the state or any political subdivision which shall cause a substantial conflict of interest, has been implemented by the Legislature. 1968 PA 317; MCLA 15.321 et seq; MSA 4.1700(51) et seq, relates to the conduct of public servants, other than members of the Legislature and state officers, in respect to contracts with public entities. (1) It must also be noted that the City of Midland Charter, ch 3, Sec. 3.15, also prohibits city officers from having a direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any contract, job or service performed for the city.
The Legislature also enacted 1968 PA 318, MCLA 15.301 et seq; MSA 4.1700(21) et seq, which relates to substantial conflicts of interest in respect to contracts on the part of members of the Legislature and state officers. (2) In OAG, 1973-1974, No 4799, p 116, 119 (February 1, 1974), it was held that 1968 PA 318, supra, Sec. 3, was unconstitutional for the reason that it purported to restrict the term 'state officer' as employed in Const 1963, art 4, Sec. 10, which provision 'was intended to apply to 'persons who serve the state in elected or appointed positions,' . . ..'
A third statute relevant to standards of conduct for public officers and employees is the state ethics act, 1973 PA 196, as last amended by 1980 PA 481, MCLA 15.341 et seq; MSA 4.1700(71) et seq. (3) 1973 PA 196, supra, Sec. 2, contains ethical standards which the Legislature has imposed upon public officers, public employees and members of state boards. See, OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra. Under 1973 PA 196, supra, Sec. 3, there is created the State Board of Ethics which, pursuant to sections 1(b)-(c) and 5 of the act, possesses jurisdiction over complaints against classified or unclassified employees within the executive branch of government, and over persons appointed by the Governor or executive department officials. See, OAG, 1977-1978, No 5156, p 66, 73-74 (March 24, 1977).
Amendatory 1980 PA 481, supra, in amending 1973 PA 196, supra, has imposed the ethical standards of section 2 of the act upon employees and officers of local units of government by providing local officers and employees with protection against job-related retaliation for 'blowing the whistle' upon local conduct in violation of the ethical standards set forth in section 2 of the act. See, also, The Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 1980 PA 469, MCLA 15.361 et seq; MSA 17.428(1) et seq. However, while amendatory 1980 PA 481, supra, extended the ethical constraints of 1973 PA 196, Sec. 2, supra, to local officials and employees, the amendatory act did not expand the jurisdiction of the State Board of Ethics to hear complaints concerning allegations of unethical conduct at the local government level. (4) With respect to the ethical constraints imposed upon local officials and employees, the ethical standards set forth in 1973 PA 196, Sec. 2, supra, pertinently provide:
'(6) A public officer or employee shall not engage in or accept employment or render services for a private or public interest when that employment or service is incompatible or in conflict with the discharge of the officer or employee's official duties or when that employment may tend to impair his or her independence of judgment or action in the performance of official duties.
'(7) A public officer or employee shall shall not participate in the negotiation or execution of contracts, making of loans, granting of subsidies, fixing of rates, issuance of permits or certificates, or other regulation or supervision relating to a business entity in which the public officer or employee has a financial or personal interest.'
As noted in OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, 'the public policy of the state, as contained in 1973 PA 196, Sec. 2(6)-(7), supra, declares it to be unethical conduct for a public officer, employee, or member of a state board to take official action on permits or other regulations relating to a a business entity in which such officer has a pecuniary or personal interest.'
B. THE COMMON LAW
Where statutory regulation of conflict of interest is not applicable, it is appropriate to refer to the common law regarding conflict of interest of public officials and employees. OAG, 1981-1982, No 5916, p 218 (June 8, 1981).
The common law of the state furnishes the second source of the law of conflict of interest. In People v Township Board of Overyssel, 11 Mich 222, 225-226 (1863), the court stated:
'All public officers are agents, and their official powers are fiduciary. They are trusted with public functions for the good of the public; to protect, advance and promote its interests, and not their own. And, a greater necessity exists than in private life for removing from them every inducement to abuse the trust reposed in them, as the temptations to which they are sometimes exposed are stronger, and the risk of detection and exposure is less. A judge cannot hear and decide his own case, or one in which he is personally interested. He may decide it conscientiously and in accordance with the law. But that is not enough. The law will not permit him to reap personal advantage from an official act performed in favor of himself.'
See OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, and OAG, 1977-1978, No 5404, p 720 (December 14, 1978).
OAG, 1981-1982, supra, cited at length from Pyatt v Mayor & Council of Borough of Dunellen in Middlesex County, 9 NJ 548; 89 A2d 1, 4 (1952), where the Supreme Court of New Jersey voided, on conflict of interest grounds, municipal ordinances vacating a street and detouring trafffic to another street where two of four councilmen voting in favor were employed by a corporation which would be benefitted thereby. The court characterized the council's deliberations on the ordinance as akin to that of a quasi-judicial tribunal, calling for the exercise of discretion. 'Therefore, the ordinances are voidable if any one of the councilmen who participated as quasi-judges was at the time disqualified by reason of private interest at variance with the impartial performance of his public duty. . . .' [Citations omitted.]
To like effect, see Wilson v Iowa City, 165 NW2d 813, 819-820 (Iowa 1969); Baker v Marley, 8 NY2d 365; 170 NE2d 900 (1960); Aldom v Borough of Roseland, 42 NJ Super 495; 127 A2d 190 (1956), cited in Barkey v Nick, 11 Mich App 381, 385; 161 NW2d 445 (1968). Cf Abrahamson v Wendell, 76 Mich App 278, 281-282; 256 NW2d 613 (1977) (on rehearing). Under the Pyatt, supra, line of authority, participation in municipal action by an official or employee with a personal or financial interest may result in the final decision being held void. OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra. On the other hand, other courts which have considered the issue 'have held that the vote of a disqualified public officer does not vitiate official action where the tainted vote was not necessary to pass the issue, particularly where there are multiple votes, only one of which is illegal. These decisions hold such official action is voidable.' [Citations omitted.] OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra.
Viewing both lines of authority, the rule that may be deduced is that participation by a member of a local legislative body in formulating quasi-judicial municipal action, where such person is employed by the beneficiary of such action, results in subjecting such municipal action to direct attack as being void or voidable. It has been stated that a city council acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when it grants or denies a privilege or benefit. Blankenship v City of Richmond, 188 Va 97; 49 SE2d 321, 323 (1948). Quasi-judicial municipal action indicates official acts based on investigation, consideration, and deliberate human judgment, involving the exercise of discretion. Oakman v City of Eveleth, 163 Minn 100; 203 NW 514, 517 (1925); State v Leyse, 60 SD 384; 244 NW 529, 531 (1932); Pyatt, supra. Where a general rule is applied to a specific interest, as in the case of a zoning change involving a specific parcel of property, a variance or conditional use permit, such action is quasi-judicial in nature. Allison v Washington County, 24 Or App 571; 548 P2d 188, 191 (1976).
In 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Sec. 13.03c, p 514 (3d Rev Ed) it is stated:
'A municipal council is primarily a legislative and administrative body, but is often vested with judicial or quasi-judicial functions. When sitting on charges involving the removal of an officer for cause, hearing matters relating to the detachment of territory from the municipality, hearing matter relating to permits, deciding election contests between rivals claimants for seats in the body, and in determining whether a member should be expelled on charges preferred, the council acts in the capacity of a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal.' [Footnotes omitted.]
Thus, where a councilmember is employed by a specific party who will be benefitted by a municipality's actions of a quasi-judicial nature in a particular case, as above illustrated, and such person takes part in such action and votes thereon, the municipality's action may be held void or voidable.
In Wilson, et al v Township Board of Burr Oak, 87 Mich 240; 49 NW 572 (1891), the unanimous action of the four-member township board in ordering the laying out of a highway pursuant to statute was held void where two members of the board were personally and financially interested in the highway's construction. The court stated: 'We think, also, that the township board erred in proceeding to lay out the highway, if . . ., two members of said board, or either of them, were financially interested in its being laid out.' Wilson, supra, 87 Mich 240, 248. It should be noted that the board had rejected the plaintiff's request that the two members in question be removed from the board, and two new appointments made, pursuant to statute. Wilson, supra, 87 Mich 240, 244. See, OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra. See, also, Woodward v City of Wakefield, 236 Mich 417; 210 NW 322 (1926); Abrahamson, supra; Barkey v Nick, supra.
These common law authorities, the statutes discussed above, and OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, must collectively be applied in concrete factual situations in order to determine whether a conflict of interest (or ethical violation of 1973 PA 196, as last amended by 1980 PA 481, supra) exists.
Thus, in response to your first question, it is my opinion that OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, and the authorities therein and here cited, have general application to the subject of conflict of interest in Michigan extending beyond the state site approval board.
(2) Does the State Ethics Act, 1973 PA 196, as last amended by 1980 PA 481, and as referred to in OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, stand for the proposition that in any matter before the city council involving the Dow Chemical Company, are employees of the company who are also members of the city council automatically in conflict of interest?
The ethical constraints of 1973 PA 196, Sec. 2, supra, are mandatory provisions which 'shall' be followed by local governmental officials and employees. As stated in my answer to your first question, and as held in OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, where a municipal official is employed by the corporate beneficiary of specific municipal action which is quasi-judicial in character, such person is in conflict of interest and may not participate in, or vote upon, such action. In the event such person who is in conflict of interest does participate in quasi-judicial municipal action, the official action may be held either absolutely void or voidable where the person's vote was determinative. See, Stockwell v The Township Board of White Lake, 22 Mich 341, 352 (1871).
Thus, in response to your second question, it is my opinion that under the common law doctrine of conflict of interest as judicially articulated, and pursuant to the ethical constraints of 1973 PA 196, Sec. 2, supra, a local governmental official or employee who is also employed by the applicant or beneficiary of specific quasi-judicial municipal action is in conflict of interest, and may not participate in nor vote upon such official action.
(3) If the answer to question 2 is in the affirmative, how may the rule of necessity, as referred to in OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, be applied?
The most authoritative statement of the rule of necessity appears in United States v Will, ---- US ----; 101 S Ct 471, 481; 66 L Ed 2d 392, 406 (1980). There, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal district court, and the Supreme Court, possessed jurisdiction of plaintiff federal judges' suit concerning constitutionality of statutes affecting judicial salaries, despite the fact that all federal judges and Justices are interested in the outcome of the case. Grounding its decision upon the rule of necessity, the Court quoted from Evans v Gore, 253 US 245, 247-248; 40 S Ct 550; 64 L Ed 887 (1920):
"Because of the individual relation of the members of this court to the question . . ., we cannot but regret that its solution falls to us . . .. But jurisdiction of the present case cannot to declined or renounced. The plaintiff was entitled by law to invoke our decision on the question as respects his own compensation in which no other judge can have any direct personal interest; and there was no other appellate tribunal to which under the law he could go."
Where another body, or another person, is able to act in place of the disqualified body or person (or persons), or where the body without the disqualified member may still act, the rule of necessity does not apply. Will v United states, supra; Stockwell, supra; Bliss v Caille Brothers Co, 149 Mich 601; 113 NW 317 (1907). See Annotation, Necessity As Justifying Action By Judicial Or Administrative Officer Otherwise Disqualified To Act In Particular Case, 39 ALR 1476, 1479-1482. Cf Shinavier v Liquor Control Commission, 315 Mich 188, 192; 23 NW2d 634 (1946).
The rule of necessity has been held by courts in other jurisdictions to be applicable to state administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers. First American Bank & Trust Co v Ellwein, 221 NW2d 509, 514-517 (ND, 1974), cert den 419 US 1026; 95 S Ct 505; 42 L Ed 2d 301, reh den 419 US 1117; 95 S Ct 798; 42 L Ed 2d 816; State ex rel Miller v Aldridge, 212 Ala 660; 103 So 835 (1925); Brinkley v Hassig, 83 F2d 351 (Cir 10, 1936); Kachian v Optometry Examining Board, 44 Wis2d 1; 170 NW2d 743 (1969).
In Stockwell, supra, which involved a four-member township board convened for removal of an officer, the court, in holding void the board's action based on one member's conflict of interest stated, in dicta, that the facts did not call for application of the rule of necessity.
However, it has been held that the rule of necessity is inapplicable where there is no need for prompt adjudication of a matter. In State, ex rel Miller v Aldridge, supra, the court declined to apply the rule of necessity where the three-member State Board of Public Accountancy sought to revoke petitioner's public accountant certificate. One of the three members had disqualified himself based on interest, bias, and prejudice, but the remaining two members declined to do so. The court, in disqualifying the two remaining members of the board, stated:
'The act establishing this board and granting to it the power to cancel certificates theretofore issued contains no provision for supplying the place of a member who recuses himself from sitting in such a proceeding on account of being disqualified. If, therefore, appellees are required to so recuse themselves, there will be no tribunal left to hear and consider the question of cancellation of appellant's certificate, and it is insisted that under these circumstances, notwithstanding appellees' disqualifications to sit, the 'doctrine of necessity,' recognized by the authorities, requires that they should hear and determine the cause. 15 R. C. L. p. 541. In the text of this authority is the following: 'It is well established that the rule of disqualification of judges must yield to the demands of necessity, as, for example, in cases where, if applied, it would destroy the only tribunal in which relief could be had.'
It may be gathered from all the authorities that the courts very generally agreed that of course the rule of disqualification is the paramount policy, and is only to yield when the necessity is so great and overwhelming that there may not be an entire failure of justice. The courts have treated the question as presenting a comparison of wrongs, or a choice of two evils. The opposition to the doctrine of necessity insists that it were better the question be delayed until the omission be remedied by legislative enactment.
The question is one of much delicacy and difficulty of determination. As to the regularly constituted judicial officers, there does not appear any occasion will arise for the application of such doctrine, as there exist constitutional and statutory provisions to meet the situation in event of disqualification of the judge. We may be pardoned for suggesting to the law making body the enactment of a general statute applicable in such cases of disqualifications to members of boards such as here under review, when in the exercise of quasi judicial functions. We leave the question still an open one in this state, as the exigencies of this case do not require that we go further than to hold the 'doctrine of necessity' is not here applicable, and that the rule of disqualification is to be applied.
'The policy of the rule of disqualification is of paramount importance, and if it is to yield in any case it is only when there exists therefor a very great necessity to prevent a failure of justice. Such a situation is not, in our opinion, here presented.' State, ex rel Miller v Aldridge, supra. 163 So 835, 837-838. [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, the court in State, ex rel Miller v Aldridge, supra, disqualified the board from acting in its quasi-judicial capacity in seeking to revoke Miller's license, viewing the matter of agency action in cases of disqualification of members of quasi-judicial entities as one for legislative action.
The public policy of Michigan, as enunciated and applied by the courts in cases of disqualification, is consistent with the reasoning of the Alabama Supreme Court in State, ex rel Miller v Aldridge, supra. In voiding the township board's action in Stockwell, supra, based on one board member's conflict of interest, the Michigan Supreme Court stated:
'[Mr. Porter] was certainly so interested in the questions to be investigated and passed upon, and in the consequences to flow from the final judgment as to bring him within the rule which forbids a person to sit in judgment upon his own rights, claims and pretentions.
'But, if this were less obvious, the court ought not to be astute to discover refined and subtle distinctions to save a case from the operation of the maxim, when the principle it embodies bespeaks the propriety of its application. The immediate rights of the litigants are not the only objects of the rule. A sound public policy, which is interested in preserving every tribunal appointed by law from discredit, imperiously demands its observance.' 22 Mich 341, 349. [Emphasis supplied.]
In OAG, 1981-1982, No 5916, supra, it was held that three members of a five-member township board were disqualified from participating (or being counted for quorum purposes) in the approval of the transfer of a property tax exemption certificate for an agricultural cooperative, where the three members in question were members or stockholders of the cooperative. See People v Township Board of Overyssel, supra, and my answer to your second question.
Thus, where a member (or members) of a local legislative body is in conflict of interest in the exercise of quasi-judicial municipal action, then such person is disqualified from participation. The Legislature may wish to consider the enactment of legislation which will address instances where quasi-judicial agency or local legislative action is affected by disqualification of a member (or members) of such body. Eg, OAG, 1981-1982, No 5916, supra, fn 2 thereof.
In the situation at hand, three of the five members of the Midland City Council are employed by the Dow Chemical Company. TheMidland Charter, ch 4, Sec. 4.6(3) provides that '[t]hree (3) members of the Council shall be a quorum for the transaction of business at all meetings of the Council . . ..' OAG, 1981-1982, No 5916, supra, further concluded that a member of a local legislative body who is disqualified from voting may not be counted for purposes of establishing a quorum. See, also, 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, Sec. 172, pp 224-225, and fn 9. It also should be noted that with respect to the two lines of authority holding void or voidable quasi-judicial municipal action where a disqualified official participates in decision-making, as discussed in my answer to your second question, the deciding courts did not apply the rule of necessity to overcome the disqualification. Thus, the three members of the five-member Midland City Council who are employed by the Dow Chemical Company may not participate in, nor be counted for quorum purposes, in any matter of a quasi-judicial nature involving their employer, Dow Chemical.
It is my opinion, therefore, that the rule of necessity may not be applied to permit otherwise disqualified members of a local legislative body to participate, or be counted for quorum purposes, in quasi-judicial municipal action. OAG, 1981-1982. No 5916, supra.
Thus, in response to your third question, it is my opinion that the rule of necessity may not be applied to allow the three members of the five-member Midland City Council employed by Dow Chemical to participate or be counted for quorum purposes in any quasi-judicial matter involving their employer. This is a matter for the Legislature. In the absence of appropriate legislation, this matter must be resolved by the electors of the city.
(4) Does OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, and the State Ethics Act, 1973 PA 196, as last amended by 1981 PA 481, overrule or modify OAG, 1977-1978, No 5404, p 720 (December 14, 1978)?
OAG, 1977-1978, No 5404, p 720 (December 14, 1978), stated that where a city council person is also employed by a private corporation seeking tax relief authorized by statute, the council person must abstain from voting on the matter if he or she owes a fiduciary obligation to the private employer. The determination whether a fiduciary obligation to the private employer exists was stated to be dependent upon the position held by the person involved. This opinion did not reach the question whether or not the proposed action was quasi-judicial in nature.
OAG, 1977-1978, No 5404, supra, was grounded solely upon the common law regarding fiduciary obligation a public official owes the public entity which is served. The Legislature has, subsequently to OAG, 1977-1978, No 5404, supra, further addressed conflict of interest pursuant to imposing the ethical constraints of 1973 PA 196, Sec. 2, supra, upon local governmental officers and employees, by virtue of amendatory 1980 PA 481, supra. See, OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra.
Thus, in response to your last question, under the facts presented, 1973 PA 196, Sec. 2, supra, and OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, require modification of OAG, 1977-1978, No 5404, supra. It is my opinion, therefore, that OAG, 1977-1978, No 5404, supra, is modified to the extent that a city councilperson or other municipal official who is employed by the intended beneficiary of quasi-judicial municipal action is in conflict of interest and may not participate in official action involving the employer of such person.
Frank J. Kelley
Attorney General
(1) 1968 PA 317, supra, was repealed by 1975 PA 227, Sec. 191. However, the repealing act was declared unconstitutional in Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227, 396 Mich 123; 240 NW2d 193 (1976). As noted in OAG, 1975-1976, No 5019, p 386, 389 (April 14, 1976), 'the law is well established in Michigan that an unconstitutional statute is void ab initio, and not merely from the date of the judicial declaration of unconstitutionality, Briggs v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co, 379 Mich 160, 165; 150 NW2d 752 (1967), . . ..' Accordingly, 1968 PA 317, supra, remains fully in effect.
It is observed that the reasoning and conclusion of OAG, 1981-1982, No 5864, supra, in no respect was grounded upon 1968 PA 317, supra.
(2) 1975 PA 227, Sec. 191, supra fn 1, also attempted to repeal 1968 PA 318, supra. The comments made in fn 1, supra, are also applicable in all respects to 1968 PA 318, supra.
(3) 1975 PA 227, Sec. 191, supra, also sought to repeal 1973 PA 196, supra. Accordingly, the comments made in fn 1, supra, with respect to the attempted repeal by 1975 PA 227, supra, are also applicable to 1973 PA 196, supra.
(4) Amendatory 1980 PA 481, supra, Sec. 2c(1) pertinently provides:
'A person who alleges a violation . . . may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act.
'(2) An action commenced pursuant to subsection (1) may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county where the complainant resides, or the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides.'
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http://opinion/datafiles/1980s/op06005.htm
State of Michigan, Department of Attorney General
Last Updated 11/10/2008 16:49:34 |
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Sat Mar 22, 2014 2:36 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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The MI Office of Attorney General opinions are on the web and can be searched by using key words, etc..
Last edited by untanglingwebs on Sun Mar 23, 2014 6:34 am; edited 1 time in total |
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Sat Mar 22, 2014 2:37 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Mark Young
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE FLINT AREA VOTER GUIDE November 6, 2012
Genesee County Commissioner 5th District (Cont.)
Candidate Q1 – How do you perceive the responsibilities of the County Board of Commissioners to the citizens of their district and the county as a whole? Q2 – As a County Commissioner, which boards would you want to serve on and why? Q3 - The county continues to face declining revenues. What are your budgeting priorities? Explain. Q4 = What changes, if any, in the structure of county government would you recommend? Why?
Mark Young (D)
My priorities to the Citizens of the 5th District will be 1) A BALANCED BUDGET, 2) PUBLIC SAFETY, and 3) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Constitutionally, the responsibilities of the County Board of Commissioners are often not clearly defined. First and foremost, the County Board must adopt a budget annually to allocate funds to those Offices/Departments that are mandated by the Michigan Constitution (i.e.: Clerk/Register of Deeds, Prosecutor, Sheriff, & Treasurer). Next, we must be exam our public safety system. The Sheriff is constantly fighting for adequate staffing and is working hard for alternative programs such as the Sheriff’s “work detail” in order to help reduce overcrowding. The Prosecutor’s office has seen approximately 35% of the Assistant Prosecutors eliminated in the past 4 years, resulting in a larger backlog of cases and has slowed the whole system down. We MUST also expand the role of the County Board in the recruitment of businesses and industry to Genesee County. This would include working with existing organizations such as the Genesee Area Chamber of Commerce, but this MUST also include a commitment by the Genesee County Board to prioritize and fund this process as needed.
As a Genesee County Commissioner, we have the opportunity to sit on committees, boards and commissions. The committees are used to review items in more detail before being brought back to the Regular Board Meeting. These committees include The Finance Committee, Community & Economic Development Committee, and Governmental Ops to name a few. The committees operate as “Committees of the Whole”, in other words ALL of the Commissioners sit on these committees. The Genesee County Commission also has seats on several boards/commissions in which the Commission may have a direct interest. These include the Road Commission, the Genesee Regional Chamber of Commerce Operating Board, Community Mental Health, the Metropolitan Planning Commission, and etc., to name a few.
I will be glad to sit on any of the Boards/Commissions that are in alignment with my previously stated priorities. As I said earlier, my priorities will be 1) A BALANCED BUDGET, 2) PUBLIC SAFETY, and 3) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
My budgeting priorities will remain the same: 1) A BALANCED BUDGET, 2) PUBLIC SAFETY, and 3) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
The two most important issues actually share a common thread: Economics. The most important issues that Genesee County has had to deal with for several years now are that of Declining Revenue and Public Safety.
The only real and lasting solution is to look tong-term and to replace the manufacturing jobs that were lost, by bringing MORE businesses and industry here. The benefits include lower unemployment, a higher standard of living, higher home values, and less crime within our communities. I would address these issues through Economic Development, by looking at and identifying what we could do to bring more businesses here to Genesee County.
This would include supporting the Karegnondi Water Authority in building a new water pipeline from Lake Huron. Large manufacturing concerns need large volumes of water. In addition to the jobs that this project would create, it will also give Genesee County additional tools to offer prospective businesses when we are asked “Why Genesee County?” The Genesee County Board must make more effort in the recruitment of businesses to Genesee County and I would do that.
The changes needed at this point, are less to the Structure on the County Government and more to the THOUGHT-PROCESSES involved. Again, we have watched what the County Board has in order to balance the budget. If this was happening to a person, they would realize somewhere along the way that they needed to “get another job” to make ends meet. We (the County) are quickly approaching that time. Now, we MUST look long-term!
The only real and lasting solution is to look tong-term, to replace the manufacturing jobs that were lost by bringing MORE industrial based businesses here, thereby producing more jobs. Whether it is computer jobs or manufacturing jobs does not matter, just so long as it is JOBS! More industrial based businesses would mean lower unemployment, higher home values, less crime within our communities, and new sources of revenues for our municipalities.
The Genesee County Board must move beyond the current problems and make more effort in the recruitment of businesses to Genesee County. As YOUR County Commissioner, I would do that! Again, my priorities will remain the same: 1) A BALANCED BUDGET, 2) PUBLIC SAFETY, and 3) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. |
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Sun Mar 23, 2014 6:33 am |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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| Asked county commissioner Northrup why he voted in support of the Shaltz contract. He surprised me when he said because it was going to pass anyway. |
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Mon Mar 24, 2014 7:48 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Reflecting on the conversation with Northrup makes me glad I had a witness. Northrup indicated that this contract was going to happen and Shaltz was going to get it. When I started to discuss that it was illegal, he promptly interrupted me to tell me it was completely legal. He then noted he did not know it did not go through Corporation Counsel for an opinion until he read it in the paper.
This is the old "Leadership Group" motto from the county past. The county is still allowing a few to make the decisions while the rest follow the lead like sheep. Voters- pay attention to the voting decisions of your commissioners and other elected officials.
TIME FOR A CHANGE.
The rumors are rampant that at least one commissioner will be arrested for his role in the Shrine prostitution and Mann Act investigation for transporting prostitutes across state line. Personally, I have seen too much corruption go unpunished, so I am not sure this will happen. |
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Tue Mar 25, 2014 6:25 am |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Mike Killbreath reported on his show this morning a comment of Sims after Sims approved the no contact bid for Shaltz. Sims was reported to have said that now that "we voted for this, I hope Shaltz tells us what he is going to do for this money"
And Sims wants to replace Stanley as State Representative? The really sad thing is that Sims was on the committee that reviewed the proposal and visited Shaltz's business operation.
Corporation Counsel Celeste Bell rewrote the document after the fact saying it was short on details and specifics. Did anyone on the committee think to ask her for a legal opinion prior to rushing this to the commission for a vote?
And why did Northrup tell me that it was inevitable for Shaltz to get this contract? Sounds like the fix was in all along. What promises were made? |
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Tue Mar 25, 2014 8:12 am |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Hasn't filed any paperwork since February 2011
Searched for: BROWN CONSULTING SERVICES, L.L.C.
ID Num: E36076
Name:BROWN CONSULTING SERVICES, L.L.C.
Type: Domestic Limited Liability Company
Resident Agent: TONY BROWN
Registered Office Address: 12159 JENNINGS RD LINDEN MI 48451
Mailing/Office Address:
Formation/Qualification Date:1-22-2009
Jurisdiction of Origin:MICHIGAN
Managed by: Members
Status: ACTIVE, BUT NOT IN GOOD STANDING AS OF 2-24-2014 Date: Present |
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Thu Mar 27, 2014 2:35 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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| The Mike Killbreath Show described a conversation with John Northrup in which Northrup was unabashed about approving the no-bid contract because he knew it had the votes. We need leaders not followers. Is this how he votes on everything? |
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Thu Mar 27, 2014 2:40 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Genesee County Board of Commissioners Chairman Jamie W ...
www.youtube.com/watch?v=pRu8IS-2Rn4
By Oakland County Michigan ·
3 min ·
26 views ·
Added Nov 21, 2013
Genesee County Board of Commissioners Chairman Jamie W. Curtis speaking at the Oakland County G2G Cloud Solutions 5 County Press Conference-11/20/2013 |
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Sat Mar 29, 2014 9:48 pm |
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