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terrybankert
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Citizen Review of Police: Approaches & Implementation
[FLINT CITIZEN- By: Terry Bankert 12.07.2005]
[This article is written in a conversational style incorporating the article cited. Parts of the article may be deleted shown by ... but additions are only found in brackets -trb]
Politics could emasculate the office of . Because the mayor appoints the chief
and the city council appoints the ombudsman, conflict between the two could
stymie the office's leverage if the mayor were to choose to ignore the
ombudsman whenever the ombudsman wished to take serious exception to a
chief's findings.Title: Citizen Review of Police: Approaches & Implementation
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles1/nij/184430.txt
Series: NIJ Issues and Practices
Author: Peter Finn
Published: March 2001
Subject: Law enforcement, program evaluation
209 pages
454,000 bytes
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Figures, charts, forms, and tables are not included in this ASCII plain-text file.
To view this document in its entirety, download the Adobe Acrobat graphic file
available from this Web site or order a print copy from NCJRS at 800-851-
3420 (877-712-9279 For TTY users).
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Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
Office of Justice Programs
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov
National Institute of Justice
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij
Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation
by Peter Finn
March 2001
NCJ 184430
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National Institute of JusticeVincent Talucci
Program Monitor
Advisory Panel*
K. Felicia Davis, J.D.
Legal Consultant and Director at Large
National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
Administrator Citizen Review Board
234 Delray Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13224
Mark Gissiner
Senior Human Resources Analyst
City of Cincinnati
Immediate Past President, 1995-99
International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
2665 Wayward Winds Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45230
Douglas Perez, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology
Plattsburgh State University
45 Olcott Lane
Rensselaer, NY 12144
Jerry Sanders
President and Chief Executive Officer
United Way of San Diego County
P.O. Box 23543
San Diego, CA 92193
Former Chief
San Diego Police Department
Samuel Walker, Ph.D.
Kiewit Professor
Department of Criminal Justice
University of Nebraska at Omaha
60th and Dodge Streets
Omaha, NE 68182
Lt. Steve Young
Vice President
Grand Lodge
Fraternal Order of Police
222 East Town Street
Columbus, OH 43215
*Among other criteria, advisory panel members were selected for their diverse
views regarding citizen oversight of police. As a result, readers should not infer
that panel members necessarily support citizen review in general or any
particular type of citizen review.
Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, by
Abt Associates Inc., under contract #OJP-94-C-007. Points of view or
opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice
Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and
the Office for Victims of Crime.
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Foreword[This article is principally concerning civilian oversight of police its review of the Flint Ombudsman office will give insight as to how Flints office was organized its purpose and procedures from a third party. I will add little to this article and encourage you to read the full work.-trb]
In many communities in the United States, residents participate to some degree
in overseeing their local law enforcement agencies. The degree varies. The most
active citizen oversight boards investigate allegations of police misconduct and
recommend actions to the chief or sheriff. Other citizen boards review the
findings of internal police investigations and recommend that the chief or sheriff
approve or reject the findings. In still others, an auditor investigates the process
by which the police or sheriff's department accept or investigate complaints and
reports to the department and the public on the thoroughness and fairness of the
process.
Citizen oversight systems, originally designed to temper police discretion in the
1950s, have steadily grown in number through the 1990s. But determining the
proper role has a troubled history.
This publication is intended to help citizens, law enforcement officers and
executives, union leaders, and public interest groups understand the advantages
and disadvantages of various oversight systems and components.
In describing the operation of nine very different approaches to citizen
oversight, the authors do not extol or disparage citizen oversight but rather try
to help jurisdictions interested in creating a new or enhancing an existing
oversight system by:
o Describing the types of citizen oversight.
o Presenting programmatic information from various jurisdictions with existing
citizen oversight systems.
o Examining the social and monetary benefits and costs of different systems.
The report also addresses staffing; examines ways to resolve potential conflicts
between oversight bodies and police; and explores monitoring, evaluation, and
funding concerns.
No one system works best for everyone. Communities must take responsibility
for fashioning a system that fits their local situation and unique needs. Ultimately,
the author notes, the talent, fairness, dedication, and flexibility of the key
participants are more important to the procedure's success than is the system's
structure....
Executive Summary
Introduction
There has been a considerable increase in the number of procedures involving
citizen oversight of police implemented by cities and counties in the 1990s.
However, many of these procedures have had a troubled history involving
serious-even bitter-conflict among the involved parties. Citizen Review of
Police: Approaches and Implementation is designed to help jurisdictions that
may decide to establish-or wish to improve-an oversight system to avoid or
eliminate these battles. At the same time, the publication can help oversight
planners understand and choose among the many options available for
structuring a citizen review procedure. Finally, current oversight staff and
volunteers may find it useful to review the publication as a way of learning more
about the field.
To provide this assistance, Citizen Review of Police describes the operations of
nine very different systems of citizen oversight. However, the publication does
not promote any particular type of citizen review-or citizen review in general.
Rather, the report is intended to help local government executives and
legislators, as well as police and sheriff's department administrators, union
leaders, and local citizen groups and public interest organizations, learn about
the advantages, drawbacks, and limitations of a variety of oversight systems
and components.
Types of Citizen Oversight
There is no single model of citizen oversight. However, most procedures have
features that fall into one of four types of oversight systems:
o Type 1: Citizens investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend
findings to the chief or sheriff.
o Type 2: Police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens
review and recommend that the chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings.
o Type 3: Complainants may appeal findings established by the police or
sheriff's department to citizens, who review them and then recommend their
own findings to the chief or sheriff.
o Type 4: An auditor investigates the process by which the police or sheriff's
department accepts and investigates complaints and reports on the
thoroughness and fairness of the process to the department and the public.
All four types of oversight are represented among the nine citizen review
systems described in this report (see exhibit 1).
Each type of system has advantages and drawbacks. For example, oversight
systems that involve investigating citizen complaints (type 1) can help reassure
the public that investigations of citizen complaints are thorough and fair.
However, hiring professional investigators can be expensive, and the
investigations model typically has no mechanism for soliciting the public's
general concerns about police conduct.
Whatever their specific advantages, any type of citizen oversight needs to be
part of a larger structure of internal and external police accountability; citizen
oversight alone cannot ensure that police will act responsibly.
Oversight Costs
Exhibit 2 presents the nine oversight systems arranged in ascending order of
budget levels along with their activity levels for 1997. As shown, there is a
theoretical relationship between the four types of oversight systems and cost.
o Type 1 oversight systems, in which citizens investigate allegations and
recommend findings (Berkeley, Flint, Minneapolis, San Francisco), are the
most expensive largely because professional investigators must be hired to
conduct the investigations-lay citizens do not have the expertise or the time.
o Type 2 systems, in which citizens review the internal affairs unit's findings
(e.g., Orange County, Rochester, St. Paul), tend to be inexpensive because
volunteers typically conduct the reviews.
o Type 3 systems, in which citizens review complainants' appeals of police
findings (Portland), can also be inexpensive because of the use of volunteers.
o Type 4 systems, in which auditors inspect the police or sheriff's department's
own complaint investigation process (Portland, Tucson), tend to fall in the
midlevel price range. On one hand, like type 1 systems, only a paid professional
has the expertise and time to conduct a proper audit. On the other hand,
typically only one person needs to be hired because the auditing process is less
time consuming than conducting investigations of citizen complaints.
In practice, however, there is an inconsistent relationship between oversight
type and cost. This is because, when examined closely, many oversight
operations are not "pure" examples of a type 1, 2, 3, or 4 system. For example,
two jurisdictions have combined two different oversight approaches: Portland
has a citizen appeals board (type 3) and an auditor who monitors the police
bureau's complaint investigation process (type 4); Tucson has both a citizen
board that reviews internal affairs findings (type 2) and an auditor (type 4).
Consequently, the actual cost for a given type of oversight system may be more
or less expensive than the cost of a pure type. Furthermore, each type of
oversight system can incorporate features that may increase or decrease its
expenses, ranging from providing policy recommendations to a mediation
option. The choice of staffing option also will affect expenditures, including
using volunteer staff or in-kind services and materials, hiring paid staff, or
diverting part of the time of an existing city or police employee to oversight
functions. As a result, it is difficult to predict an oversight system's actual costs
before determining all its features and activities.
Finally, more money may not buy more oversight activity or increase use of the
system-that is, boost the number of complaints, hearings, mediations, policy
recommendations, reviews, or audits. A variety of cost-insensitive
considerations-the public's perception of the system's fairness, the director's
impartiality and talent, the level of cooperation from the police or sheriff's
department, and restrictions on the kinds of complaints the system will be
prohibited from handling or required to accept-can prevent additional funds
from resulting in increased use of the oversight system. That said, an oversight
procedure that is underfunded will not only have difficulty achieving its
objectives, it also may create more controversy surrounding police
accountability than it resolves.
...
Conclusions
This report suggests at least four other significant conclusions regarding citizen
oversight of the police.
Local jurisdictions that wish to establish citizen review have to take on the
responsibility to make difficult choices about the type of oversight system they
should fashion. The tremendous variation in how the nine oversight systems
described in this report conduct business-and pay for their activities-may seem
discouraging: The lack of similarity makes it difficult for other jurisdictions to
make an automatic selection of commonly implemented citizen review features
around which they can structure their own oversight procedures. On the
positive side, this diversity means jurisdictions do not have to feel obligated to
follow slavishly any one model or approach; they have the freedom to tailor the
various components of their system to the particular needs and characteristics
of their populations, law enforcement agencies, statutes, collective bargaining
agreements, and pressure groups.
Many individuals and groups believe that citizen oversight, despite its serious
limitations, can have important benefits. Complainants have reported that they:
o Feel "validated" when the oversight body agrees with their allegations-or
when they have an opportunity to be heard by an independent overseer
regardless of the outcome.
o Are satisfied at being able to express their concerns in person to the officer.
o Feel they are contributing to holding the department accountable for officers'
behavior.
Police and sheriff's department administrators have reported that citizen
oversight:
o Improves their relationship and image with the community.
o Has strengthened the quality of the department's internal investigations of
alleged officer misconduct and reassured the public that the process is thorough
and fair.
o Has made valuable policy and procedure recommendations.
Local elected and appointed officials say an oversight procedure:
o Enables them to demonstrate their concern to eliminate police misconduct.
o Reduces in some cases the number of civil lawsuits (or successful suits)
against their cities or counties.
It is sometimes possible to overcome disagreements between oversight
operations and police and sheriff's departments. The report identifies many
points of conflict between oversight systems and police and sheriff's
departments-and with officer unions. However, as illustrated in exhibit 3, there
are positions each side can take and explanations it can offer that can
sometimes make the system acceptable to everyone involved. A critical step to
minimizing conflict is for the police or sheriff's department--and union
leadership--to act as colleagues in the planning process.
The talent, fairness, dedication, and flexibility of the key participants--in
particular, the oversight system's director, chief elected official, police chief or
sheriff, and union president--are more important to the procedure's success than
is the system's structure. The report identifies jurisdictions in which these
individuals have worked together cooperatively. An effective procedure for
selecting competent and objective oversight investigators, board members, and
administrators--and for training them thoroughly--is also critical for the oversight
procedure to thrive.
...
Key Points
o Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation is written primarily
for local government officials and legislators. Union leaders, local citizen groups,
and new oversight staff may also find the publication useful.
o The publication describes nine citizen oversight procedures to enable these
audiences to benefit from the experiences of communities that have already
established oversight procedures.
o While there is no single model of citizen oversight, most systems fall into one
of four types:
--Type 1: Citizens investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend
findings to the chief or sheriff.
--Type 2: Police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens
review and recommend that the chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings.
--Type 3: Complainants may appeal findings established by the police
department to citizens, who review them and then recommend their own
findings to the chief or sheriff.
--Type 4: An auditor investigates the process by which the police or sheriff's
department accepts and
investigates complaints and reports on the process' thoroughness and fairness.
o Oversight bodies can also:
--Recommend changes in department policies and procedures and suggest
improvements in training.
--Arrange for mediation.
--Assist the police or sheriff's department to develop or operate an early
warning system for identifying problem officers.
o If they wish to implement citizen review, to make an informed decision about
which type of oversight procedure to adopt jurisdictions need to examine
tradeoffs inherent in choosing a model: Most features of every model have
drawbacks as well as benefits.
o Citizen oversight has the potential to benefit many groups.
o Complainants have reported feeling:
--"Validated" when their allegations are sustained--or merely appreciated
having an opportunity to be heard by an independent third party.
--Gratified they are able to address an officer directly.
--Satisfied the process appears to help hold police and sheriff's departments
accountable.
o Police administrators have said that oversight can:
--Improve their relationship and image with the community.
--Increase public understanding of the nature of police work.
--Promote the goals of community policing.
--Improve the quality of the department's internal investigations.
--Reassure a skeptical public that the department already investigates citizen
complaints thoroughly and fairly.
--Help subject officers feel vindicated.
--Help discourage misconduct.
--Improve the department's policies and procedures.
o Elected and appointed officials have indicated that oversight:
--Demonstrates their concern for police conduct to constituents.
--Can reduce the number, success rates, and award amounts of civil suits
against the city or county.
o Members of the community at large have suggested that oversight has helped
to:
--Reassure the community that appropriate discipline is being handed out for
misconduct.
--Discourage police misconduct.
--Increase their understanding of police behavior.
o There are serious limitations to what citizen review can accomplish. To be
most effective, citizen oversight must complement other internal and external
mechanisms for police accountability.
...
A Short History of Citizen Review
The demand for citizen oversight first occurred in the 1950s and 1960s as a
result of the civil rights movement and the perception in many quarters that law
enforcement responded to racial unrest with excessive force. Many of these
early review procedures were short lived.[1]
Citizen review revived in the early 1970s as urban African-Americans gained
more political power and as more white political leaders came to see the need
for improved police accountability. Most oversight procedures have come into
existence after a high-profile case of alleged police misconduct (usually a
shooting or other physical force incident), often involving white officers and
minority suspects. Racial or ethnic allegations of discrimination are often at the
heart of movements to introduce citizen oversight.[2]
By 2000, citizen review has become more widespread than ever before in the
United States. As of early 1998, there were more than 90 citizen review
procedures. Almost 80 percent of the largest cities had some form of
citizen review.[3] However, only a small fraction of law enforcement agencies
in the country had citizen oversight.
1. Snow, Robert, "Civilian Oversight: Plus or Minus," Law and Order 40
(December 1992): 51-56.
2. Terrill, Richard J., "Civilian Oversight of the Police Complaints Process in the
United States: Concerns, Developments, and More Concerns," in Complaints
Against the Police: The Trend to External Review, ed. Andrew J. Goldsmith,
Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1991; see also Walker, Samuel, and Vic
W. Bumphus, "The Effectiveness of Civilian Review: Observations on Recent
Trends and New Issues Regarding the Civilian Review of Police," American
Journal of Police 11 (4) (1992): 1-26.
3. Walker, Samuel, Achieving Police Accountability, Research Brief,
Occasional Paper Series no. 3, New York: Center on Crime Communities &
Culture, 1998: 5.
...
The Flint, Michigan, Ombudsman's Office: An Ombudsman Investigates
Selected Citizen Complaints Against All City Departments and Agencies
Background
Sweden first incorporated the ombudsman concept in its constitution in 1909 as
a means of curbing governmental abuses and protecting citizen rights. Today, an
ombudsman typically investigates unlawful or unfair acts on the part of
government agencies and complaints about their services.
In 1974, Flint voters adopted a new charter establishing an Office of the
Ombudsman along with a strong mayoral form of government. Because some
citizens felt a stronger mayor would need some checks and balances, the
electorate simultaneously voted to include the ombudsman's office in the new
charter for a 5-year period. In a 1980 referendum, nearly 60 percent of the
residents voted to continue the ombudsman's office indefinitely.
The Flint City Charter states that "The Ombudsman may investigate official acts
of any agency which aggrieve any person." City departments are required to
provide information the ombudsman requests, and the office has the power to
subpoena witnesses (including police officers), administer oaths, and take
testimony. If elected officials or appointees refuse to cooperate, the charter
provides for an obstruction hearing that could result in their forfeiting their jobs.
The ombudsman establishes his or her own rules for receiving and processing
complaints, conducting investigations and hearings, and reporting findings. In
1996, the ombudsman's office investigated 662 cases, 313 of which (47
percent) involved complaints against police officers. In 1995, 389 of 741 cases
(52 percent) involved complaints against the police. The office sustains 2 to 4
percent of citizen complaints against the police annually.
The review process
Exhibit 2-5 shows the process the ombudsman's office uses to review
complaints.
Intake
People learn about the ombudsman's office from high-profile cases covered by
the media or by word of mouth from coworkers. The police department's IA
unit does not inform citizens about the ombudsman unless they report they are
unsatisfied with the department's answers to their questions. In addition, the
ombudsman's preferred response to complaints is to refer them to the
appropriate supervisor, accepting complaints primarily when the citizen does
not want to file with the police department or is dissatisfied with the supervisor's
response, or when the complaint appears to involve the use of excessive force.
Citizens who want to file complaints with the ombudsman must agree to be
interviewed at the ombudsman's office or at a location of their choosing. The
ombudsman assigns the citizens to one of two investigators who specialize in
police complaints.
Informal resolutions
The assigned investigator may telephone the IA commander to resolve the
complaint informally, such as clarifying a policy or procedure and then providing
the explanation to the complainant. The IA commander may also choose to ask
the shift commander of the subject officer to investigate the problem and then
explain the officer's behavior to the complainant. About one-quarter of
complaints reported to the ombudsman are settled by means of these informal
approaches.
The ombudsman office investigator's next option is mediation. If both parties
agree, the investigator arranges a meeting through the officer's supervisor, if
necessary walking the complainant to the police department to talk with the
supervisor. The citizen and supervisor meet together alone. If the citizen is not
satisfied, he or she then can file a complaint with the ombudsman.
Formal investigations
When the ombudsman's office accepts a complaint, the investigator sends the
chief a letter reporting the complaint and asking for a response to questions
from the officer. The chief sends the letter down the chain of command to the
subject officer, who usually responds to the questions in writing or, on rare
occasions, in an interview.
The investigator also interviews the complainant for his or her account of the
incident and the names of witnesses. Investigators usually tape the interview.
The investigator attempts to contact witnesses by telephone and, where
appropriate, sends letters to homes in the immediate area of the incident. As
needed, the investigator also takes photos at the scene, secures medical
records, and undertakes other pertinent investigatory activities. The
ombudsman's office has never subpoenaed a witness.
The investigator turns in a report to the chief investigator or deputy ombudsman
indicating agreement or disagreement with the citizen's allegation(s). The
investigator meets with the deputy or ombudsman to decide on a finding.
Findings
The ombudsman's office either sustains or does not sustain each allegation,
sustaining only if there is clear and convincing evidence. The office sends a
complete report of each investigation to the chief and the city council. The office
recommends whether there should be discipline but not the type of discipline.
When the ombudsman's office concludes the officer did something
wrong-which happens 5 to 10 times a year-it sends the officer and the chief a
synopsis of its investigation with its conclusion. The chief then conducts his own
investigation through IA or the officer's commander and makes a final
determination of how to proceed. (See "The Chief's Response to an
Ombudsman Investigation.")
The chief sends the ombudsman his finding. He does not inform the
ombudsman's office about IA's finding, and he has the discretion not to tell the
office whether he imposed any discipline. However, on occasion the city
council has asked the chief to explain his response to an ombudsman's report.
The ombudsman's investigator telephones or writes each complainant to report
the chief's decision. The typical case is resolved in 3 weeks.
Other activities
Because there is no shield of confidentiality in Michigan, the ombudsman's
office has considerable latitude in informing the press about its cases and
criticizing officers by name. The office routinely sends its case reports to the city
clerk as public documents for the city archives. However, the city charter
requires that "No report or recommendation that criticizes an official act shall be
announced until every agency or person affected is allowed reasonable
opportunity to be heard with the aid of counsel." As a result, the ombudsman's
office circulates the report on every sustained complaint to everyone named in
the report (except the complainant), giving them 5 days in which to challenge its
factual accuracy (but not the findings).
Staffing and budget
By a two-thirds majority of the nine members, the city council appoints the
ombudsman for a single 7-year term. A three-quarters majority on the council
can remove the ombudsman.
At one time, the office had as many as nine investigators, but by 1998 the
number had declined to five. Two investigators handle police complaints full
time, and the deputy investigator takes on some police complaints as well. The
ombudsman appoints a deputy ombudsman and the investigators. The office
has an attorney on contract to answer legal questions.
There was no ombudsman's office director between August 1995 and the end
of 1998. When the previous director was fired in 1995, a court ruled that the
city could not hire a new director as long as a civil suit by the fired employee
was still pending. The deputy ombudsman or senior investigator ran the office in
the absence of a director. In September 1998, a Michigan appeals court ruled
that the city could hire a new director.
As shown in exhibit 2-6, the ombudsman's 1998-99 budget was $540,744; 91
percent of the budget represented wages and benefits. With two investigators
devoting nearly full time to complaints against the police, and the deputy
devoting about one-quarter time to police cases, the proportion of the budget
devoted to complaints against the police is about $174,000.
Distinctive features
Few jurisdictions in the country make use of an ombudsman to review police
misconduct complaints.
o Because the ombudsman serves as a generalized complaint handler for all
government agencies, the city cannot be criticized for singling out the police for
oversight.
o The ombudsman's office provides citizens with an alternative place to file
complaints against the police department.
o The ombudsman's office helps IA to address complainants' concerns by
offering a satisfactory explanation for an officer's behavior that the complainant
could not or would not get from the subject officer or patrol desk.
o The office can subpoena department heads, including the chief, as well as
employees and all case files. It has never used this power.
o The office can-and does-criticize officers by name in the media for their
behavior. This may serve to deter some misconduct and anger officers. The
public has the opportunity to become aware of police misconduct when the
press prints the information.
o Politics could emasculate the office. Because the mayor appoints the chief
and the city council appoints the ombudsman, conflict between the two could
stymie the office's leverage if the mayor were to choose to ignore the
ombudsman whenever the ombudsman wished to take serious exception to a
chief's findings.
The Flint Citizen is a publication of Attorney Terry R. Bankert (Family Law ) of Flint Michigan USA.
http://enewsblog.com/terrybankert/
attorneybankert@yahoo.com
Terry R. Bankert P.C., 1000 Beach St., Flint MI 48503 810.235.1970 fax 234-5080 |
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Thu Dec 08, 2005 6:49 am |
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Ted Jankowski
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| I just took the time to read more of your post. I was surprised to see the process and how it was supposed to work. That was nothing like the way it worked when I went down there. You broke down the system. It really isn't a complicated process. Common sense actually. I can see now many complaints could be resolved if you actually have someone in that office willing to do the job. I still haven't read the whole thing. I pledge to finish it eventually. I'm glad everything is online like this. It's almost better than actually having a meeting. As we can almost always go back in the history and find what was discussed months or weeks ago, WORD for word. No mistaking what was said. This is an excellent tool. |
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Fri Dec 23, 2005 10:55 pm |
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Adam Ford
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This topic has 21,000 views!!! Is someone doing a refresh or what? There's only like 100,000 people that live in Flint and I assume the majority of those do not have internet???
Adam Ford
http://mysearchisover.com
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Tue Dec 27, 2005 5:28 pm |
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rapunzel
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We need a functioning ombudsman for checks and balances.
If only to reduce lawsuits it would be a good thing.
I was at a recent crime watch meeting where there were allegations of police tipping off drug houses to upcoming busts. They said they could trust some of the COPS but not all. They were discussing the area near Williams school that does not have an active crime watch. A few local MOMs are running off prostitutes and say the police are scared to come into the area. These ladies are gonna get hurt if they aren't more careful. Another crime watch is trying to help them get organized and do things the safe way.
The allegations were made at the end of the meeting after local officers had left. |
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Tue Dec 27, 2005 9:32 pm |
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rapunzel
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At another recent crime watch meeting the complaints regarding the area near William's school were brought up again. The new principal at William's was also in attendance. Citing numerous break ins and arson at the city owned pool adjacent to the site.
Our new community officer addressed this situation promply on his next shift. Arrested two men one with a gun and one with drugs in the school safe zone. We will watch closely the prosecution of these alleged miscreants.
Why did if have to get so bad before calls were answered in this area? Does it take a millage to get police response? Will we get police support after the millage passes or will the community officers that care be transfered to regular duty.
On the same night of this crime watch meeting there were shots fired in the kearsley park area. Calls were made to 911 and to Mott security. A young man was hunted down by a gun man he hid in his grandmothers house with a gunman banging on the door. Police showed up 20 minutes later and did not get out of the car! Citizens went and picked up shell casings. This is being investigated by Police admin. Would they bother investigating if not for the millage on the horizon? Who would we go to if they did not?
OMBUDSMAN!
Citizen's are taking our communities back with the help of our community police. We support our officer's. We now know how this partnership should be functioning. If we once again fall back on lazy attitudes we need a citizen's watchdog to take our case. We are holding the line and losing is not an option. |
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Wed Jan 25, 2006 10:47 pm |
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Ted Jankowski
F L I N T O I D
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LOL LOL LOL Your starting to sound like me. Why are you being so negative? You know as well as I do, that as soon a the milage is passed. All those officers we've seen in the last three months are going to disappear again. The Seven Eleven's will be packed full 24/7 with Flint Police officers. Or they will be sitting back in their houses again sleeping on the couch with the car parked in the driveway. (Do you remember that one?)
quote:
Our new community officer addressed this situation promply on his next shift. Arrested two men one with a gun and one with drugs in the school safe zone. We will watch closely the prosecution of these alleged miscreants.
On a day to day basis. The police have for years refused to even the bare minimum. As shown by the incident you are mentioning there at Kearsley park. For some reason. If you live in that area. You are considered a second class citizen. Just as you mentioned. They won't even get out of the car. When the officer came out to harass me about my Dog's barking at a crack head felon. She didn't get out of the car. When my house and car was ran into by a drunk driver. The investigating officer didn't even get out of the car. The detective on the case never once talked to me or even came over to the house (at least that I know of). But get a group of citizens together and complain. The Low and behold. They finally do their job. WHY? WHY DO HE HAVE TO BEG THEM TO DO THIER JOB???
If for the last 30 years the officers of Flint had done at least the bare minimum. (Just driving by is not the bare minimum.) If they actually did more than just give lip service. Or get out of their car and look around. I would be the first one to be promoting paying higher taxes to get them a raise. Everyone tells me. They are all bad. That may be true. But, I sure cannot find the ones that are. And I do at times believe it is not always the patrol officers fault. The management of the dept or leadership just flat out sucks. Information is not passed on form one shift to another. Officers have been moved around, and moved around. They never really get to know the community they are working in.
The Flint police refuse to build trust. You don’t build trust by getting a grant money to work on community relations. You build trust by showing up promptly. You build trust by looking into the problem. You build trust by following up on incidents. You build trust during investigations. By talking to the neighbors when a crime has been committed. Knock on their doors. When there is a break in, cops don’t even ask neighbors if they have seen anything. Why should anyone have to beg the Police for an update on a crime that the police should be actively investigating? I am 99.9% sure the Flint police have solved more cases than they know they have. Because, they refuse to go after the “PETTY CRIMES” like home invasion, car theft, car break ins, etc. These people committing these so called low priority crimes are in many cases the same ones committing the more serious ones. The police have arrested and put in prison a few of these criminals. And crime has dropped. However, the refused to do anything about the smaller crimes these people were committing. By lack of enforcement of crimes such as breaking and entering, car theft, possession of weapons by felons, letting people go because of only having a bag of Mary Jane. They condition criminals to think they can pretty much do what they want without fear of prosecution or arrest.
Whether the Police actually solve a case or not they should be following up. The county sheriff dept follows up. Now there is a thoroughly impressive police force. Following up with the citizens paying your paycheck. Let’s us know they are doing their job. Phrases that convey indifferent sentiments such as their favorite one, “Well what do you want me to do about it?” do not build trust. They build animosity, disgust, mistrust. We the people look at it as. I pay taxes for you to collect a paycheck. And it says on the side of your car “To protect and serve”. We don’t pay you to be belligerent and lackadaisical. |
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Thu Jan 26, 2006 9:24 am |
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