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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Sun Dec 08, 2013 8:54 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Wednesday, November 18,2009
The hearing
A decade-old court hearing raises new questions about whether Tina Houghton was eligible to run for the Lansing City Council
by Neal McNamara
Ten years ago, an Ingham County Circuit judge said in a hearing that a would-be candidate for Lansing City Council was ineligible to be on the ballot because she was delinquent on property taxes.
The case is strikingly similar to that of Tina Houghton, who was permitted to run for City Council this year even though she was delinquent on taxes. Houghton beat incumbent Sandy Allen in the Second Ward on Nov. 4.
In a 1999 hearing, Judge Carolyn Stell said that Belinda Fitzpatrick was ineligible to run for City Council because she was late on her taxes. Like Houghton, Fitzpatrick’s taxes had been turned over to the county for collection.
“A person who has delinquent property taxes is in default to the city,” Stell said at the hearing, which does not hold the same weight as a ruling or a court order.
Stell’s sentiments seem to contradict the view of City Attorney Brigham Smith, who said that since Houghton’s taxes were turned over to the county when she registered in May to become a candidate, she did not owe back taxes to Lansing. On March 1 of each year, back city taxes from the previous year are turned over to Ingham County for collection.
When Fitzpatrick tried to file to run on May 10, 1999, it was more than two months after her unpaid city property taxes were turned over to the county for collection.
Houghton has not paid $3,317.74 in taxes, combined, from 2008 and this year’s summer taxes, which were due on Aug. 31. The 2008 taxes had already been turned over to the county for collection when Houghton filed to run for Council, but the 2009 taxes were not yet due.
When asked last week whether Houghton had been eligible to run for office, Smith said that the “longstanding opinion of this office is that being in default does not prevent a candidate from running or winning … .”
However, the affidavit that a candidate signs when taking office asks for an affirmative or negative response to the statement, “I am not in default at the time I am executing this affidavit on any of my financial obligations to the city including, but not limited to, property taxes, income taxes, special assessments and/or parking tickets, or other obligations.”
In a video tape of a court hearing in Fitzpatrick’s case, a copy of which Fitzgerald allowed a City Pulse reporter to view, Fitzgerald argues the same position as the city is taking now in regard to Houghton — that because Ingham County becomes a collection agency for property taxes after March 1 for any unpaid taxes from the previous year that a candidate seeking to run for office in May is actually in default to the county.
Arguing on behalf of the city in 1999 was Billie O’Berry, who is still an assistant city attorney. In her arguments against Fitzpatrick, O’Berry argues that even after March 1, a candidate would still be in debt to the city.
“It’s an obligation on real property located in the city of Lansing and it is an obligation to the city of Lansing from which they arise,” O’Berry told Stell, speaking about property taxes.
O’Berry goes on to say that Fitzpatrick did not cure her debt before filing to run for office, and therefore should not be on the ballot.
Smith said that O’Berry was charged with upholding then Lansing City Clerk Marilyn Slade’s actions in keeping Fitzpatrick off the ballot, which doesn’t necessarily reflect his office’s current view of language in the City Charter.
Stell, in denying Fitzpatrick’s suit to be on the ballot, relied in part on a case out of the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Michigan in the matter of Corrigan v. City of Newaygo. In that case, Judge Robert Holmes Bell upheld that a city clerk in Newaygo had acted properly in keeping two candidates off the ballot because they owed property taxes.
Slade said that she would regularly check whether candidates who filed for office were behind on property taxes, had criminal records, or owed any other debt to the city. Slade, who now lives in Arizona, started doing this after she was defeated in an election by a woman who it turned out had unpaid taxes and never took office.
“The county collects (late taxes), but who gets the revenue? The city,” Slade said. “When I was there, that was made pretty clear to me. I suppose everyone can have a different opinion.”
City Clerk Chris Swope said that he was unaware of Slade’s past practice in checking all of the candidates who filed for office against their qualifications according to the City Charter.
“We do perform that process when there’s a Council vacancy and when Council is going to be making an appointment,” Swope said. “When we’re in that type of situation, there isn’t the public and opposing candidates with the ability to make that scrutiny.”
When asked if he would still have allowed Houghton to run for office if he had found out in May that she owed taxes, he agreed with Smith’s interpretation that the City Charter does not preclude someone from running for office.
Also at issue is whether Houghton was eligible to serve on the city’s Parks Board. On Oct. 31, 2007, Houghton filled out an application to become a member of the Parks Board and was confirmed by the City Council in December of that year. However, according to Ingham County records, Houghton’s 2007 property taxes went unpaid until May 2008. At the top of the application form for membership on a city board is the statement, “The charter prohibits appointees who are indebted to any city agency for any judgments, fees, parking tickets, assessments, unpaid taxes, or any other monies due to the City.”
Swope said that his office doe not have any part in board appointments, and that the mayor makes appointments, which are approved by the Council. Smith said that the matter would probably have to be cleared up before the next Parks Board meeting, but he also said that he would have to find out whether Houghton understood she was in default when she filled out the application.
Houghton did not return a call seeking comment, and Randy Hannan, Mayor Virg Bernero’s deputy chief of staff, did not return a call asking whether the mayor knew about Houghton’s back taxes either during this election or when she was appointed to the Parks Board. |
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Sun Dec 08, 2013 8:56 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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This took place in Illinois:
Judge orders 28th Ward candidate off the ballot — AustinTalks
austintalks.org/2011/01/judge-orders-28th-ward-candidate-off-the...
West Side residents will have three candidates to consider on ... candidates ineligible for office if they owe the city money. ... makes him ineligible for ...Newsletter
Judge orders 28th Ward candidate off the ballot
by Sarah Ostman on January 28, 2011
A Cook County Circuit Court judge upheld an objection to Rev. Michael Stinson’s election petition today and ordered the pastor off the ballot in the 28th Ward aldermanic race, citing a 2-year-old Illinois Supreme Court ruling that makes candidates ineligible for office if they owe the city money.
In a rare move, Circuit Court Judge Robert Bertucci overturned a previous Chicago Board of Elections decision, saying the panel was “clearly erroneous” when it shot down an objection filed by a staffer to newly appointed alderman – and Stinson competitor – Jason Ervin.
The objection claimed that Stinson should be removed from the ballot because of an outstanding parking ticket debt to the city of Chicago.
Stinson said he plans to appeal.
“This is really the old style of politics,” said Stinson, 44, pastor of the First General Assembly Church in Englewood. “Instead of debating the issues … knock ‘em off the ballot, and then we don’t have to debate ‘em.”
Friday’s ruling is a clear victory for Ervin, who is vying for a full four-year term on Feb. 22. The objection– which was filed by one of his workers, 28th Ward Community Service Coordinator Eileen Jackson – succeeded in removing one of Ervin’s competitors from the race, increasing the odds that Ervin will receive the 51 percent of the vote needed to avoid a run-off election.
That leaves three candidates on next month’s ballot – in the 28th Ward: Ervin, the village manager of Maywood and longtime aide to former Ald. Ed Smith; Carmelita Earls, commander of operations for the Chicago Fire Department’s Training Academy; and bar manager William Siegmund.
Ervin said earlier this month that he was aware of Jackson’s objection but that it was not his place to comment on it. Jackson has not responded to requests for comment.
Would-be politicians frequently challenge one another’s election petitions as a way of knocking competitors off the ballot. For years, candidates have taken aim at the validity of one another’s petition signatures and residency claims, and competitors who are unfamiliar with the election process or can’t afford a lawyer tend to be easily knocked off.
But this election is the first in which a candidate’s alleged debts may also be used against them. Until 2008, candidates who were found to have outstanding debts to the city could cement a place on the ballot, as long as they paid their debts before taking office, said Stinson’s attorney, Adam Lasker.
An Illinois Supreme Court ruling, Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, changed that. Since that quiet-but-important ruling, candidates must be free and clear of these debts when they sign their candidacy paperwork.
Jackson filed numerous objections against Stinson, but the one that stuck was a “Cinkus” claim alleging that the pastor owed more than $600 in parking tickets, dating back to at least 2003. Stinson has denied having any outstanding tickets and has said he didn’t own a car at the time the tickets were allegedly issued.
Earlier this month, a hearing officer overseeing Stinson’s case found that the candidate likely did have outstanding tickets. However, the Board of Elections voted against the hearing officer’s findings, stating that the first-time candidate should be allowed to stay on the ballot because there was no proof Stinson had been notified about those tickets.
Jackson appealed, and Bertucci on Friday overturned the panel’s decision, in essence determining that even if Stinson was unaware of the debt, its existence still makes him ineligible for office.
“That’s the fact of the case, and what the law dictates,” the judge said.
Lasker said the decision could create a “dangerous precedent” in which incumbent politicians could fabricate debts to get their opponents kicked off the ballot – especially in smaller suburban communities.
“I see all kinds of funny things happening in these electoral board cases in the suburbs,” he said.
Ballots for the 28th Ward race have not yet been printed, said James Scanlon, Board of Elections general counsel, so Stinson’s name will not appear.
austintalks.org@gmail.com |
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Sun Dec 08, 2013 9:02 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
MIKE COX, ATTORNEY GENERAL
CITY CHARTERS:
HOME RULE CITY ACT:
PUBLIC OFFICERS:
The meaning of the term "in default" in the Home Rule City Act that renders a person ineligible for city contracts or appointments
The phrase "in default to the city" as used in section 5(f) of the Home Rule City Act, 1909 PA 279, MCL 117.5(f), which disqualifies one from receiving a city contract or appointment, means that, at the point in time the contract or appointment is to be made or given, the person has failed to meet a financial, contractual, or other obligation to the city after adequate notice of the obligation and an opportunity to cure it were provided to the person and the obligation is not the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding.
Opinion No. 7241
February 10, 2010
Honorable John Espinoza
State Representative
The Capitol
Lansing, MI 48909
You have asked about the meaning of the term "in default" as it is used in section 5 of the Home Rule City Act (HRCA or Act), 1909 PA 279, MCL 117.5.
The HRCA empowers cities to conduct their own affairs subject to the Constitution and general laws of the State. Rental Property Owners Ass'n of Kent County v Grand Rapids, 455 Mich 246, 254; 566 NW2d 514 (1997). The Act identifies various subjects that cities are required to include in their charters as well as those that are discretionary. MCL 117.3 and MCL 117.4a -117.4r. Section 36 of the HRCA, MCL 117.36, provides that no provision of a city charter shall conflict with or contravene any general law of this State.
Your question involves section 5, which sets forth a number of restrictions on the powers of a city. In particular, subsection 5(f) provides that a city does not have the power to "make a contract with, or give an official position to, one who is in default to the city." MCL 117.5. (Emphasis added.)
Most city charters include a provision acknowledging this limitation on their powers that typically restates the requirements of section 5. Some city charters contain standards to guide the city in awarding contracts and granting official city positions, but such provisions may be no less stringent than those provided in state law. For example, a city charter may provide that a default does not occur until a specified period of time after an obligation, debt, or payment is due or that a default will not occur while the obligation, debt, or payment is being contested in an administrative tribunal or court of law.
The Legislature has not defined the term "in default" in the HRCA; therefore, it is subject to interpretation in accordance with well-established rules of statutory construction.1
The foremost rule, and the primary task in construing a statute, is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). As summarized in Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002):
When interpreting statutory language, our obligation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed
in the statute. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). . . .
* * *
Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute
surplusage or nugatory. Wickens, supra at 60. Further, we give undefined statutory terms their plain and ordinary meanings. Donajkowski [v Alpena
Power Co., 460 Mich 243, 248-249; 596 NW2d 574 (1999)]; Oakland Co Road Comm'rs v Michigan Property & Cas Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich. 590, 604;
575 NW2d 751 (1998). In those situations, we may consult dictionary definitions. Id.
Moreover, statutory language must be read in context with the entire act, giving consideration to both the plain meaning of the critical phrase or word and its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. Sweatt v Dep't of Corrrections, 468 Mich 172, 179; 661 NW2d 201 (2003). Because even the most common word can have a number of different meanings, context is helpful to determine which of the ordinary meanings found in a dictionary is the one intended in the statute under review. Bio-Magnetic Resonance Inc v Dep't of Public Health, 234 Mich App 225, 229-231; 593 NW2d 641 (1999).
Legal encyclopedias have commented on the difficulty of defining the word "default" when used as a noun:
There is perhaps no larger or looser word. It is a purely relative term, like "negligence," and means nothing more, and nothing less, than not doing
what is reasonable under the circumstances – not doing something which one ought to do, having regard to the relations which one occupies toward
the other persons in the transaction. It has been said that the word obviously has two meanings, one relating to a failure to perform, the other to
conversion or misappropriation of that which belongs to another. [26A CJS, Default, pp 126-127.]
Section 5(f) of the HRCA states in plain terms that a city lacks the power to make a contract with, or give an official position to, one who is in default to the city. These words are forward-looking in nature, leading to the conclusion that the prohibition in section 5(f) applies only to prospective contracts and office holders rather than to existing contracts and existing office holders.2
OAG, 1935-1936, No 120, p 316 (October 29, 1935), examined a charter provision that excluded from elective office a candidate who was in default to the city, concluding that an element over and above a mere failure to perform was necessary to establish a default: "The term 'in default to the city', as here used, implies more than a mere civil debt or liability. There must exist a willful omission to account or pay over funds belonging to the city with a corrupt intention." Id. p 316. OAG No 120 was followed in Letter Opinion of Attorney General Frank J. Kelley to acting City Attorney Don E. Hiltunen, dated September 26, 1974, which concluded that a provision of the Hancock City Charter prohibiting a person who was in default to the city from being elected to city office "cannot be construed to apply to one who merely has delinquent tax assessments owing the city."
In determining whether these opinions remain viable, it is necessary to reiterate that the overarching principle of statutory construction is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature based on the plain language of a statute, with due regard to the context in which the words are used. The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1991), defines "default" in several ways:
1. To fail to do what is required. 2. To fail to pay money when it is due. 3. Law. a. To fail to appear in court when summoned. b. To lose a case by not appearing.
The third of these definitions is easily dismissed as inapplicable in the context presented by section 5(f) of the HRCA because it applies to court procedures. The first and second definitions, however, both appear relevant because each could reasonably apply to disqualify a person from consideration to hold a position of public trust or perform a public contract.
The first of the above definitions ("[t]o fail to do what is required") clearly applies in the context of one charged with an existing duty, who is regarded as defaulting in the performance of that duty, or to a person who has failed to perform a contractual or other obligation. Such an application of the term "default" is found in the case of Lansing School District v City of Lansing, 260 Mich 405, 412; 245 NW 449 (1932), which involved a school district's attempt to recover losses resulting from a city treasurer's negligent conduct. The statute at issue made the city liable for any loss sustained by the "default" of the officer in the discharge of any duty imposed by the statute. The Lansing Court noted the following definitions of the word "default" in holding the city liable to the school district:
A default is defined as "The nonperformance of a duty, whether arising under a contract or otherwise" (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary [Rawle's 1st Rev.],
p. 527); as "The omission or failure to fulfil a duty, observe a promise, discharge an obligation, or perform an agreement" (Black's Law Dictionary [2d Ed.],
p. 342); as "To fail in fulfilling a contract, agreement, or duty." "Neglect to do what duty or law requires" (Webster's International Dictionary). [Id. p 412.]
The second American Heritage Dictionary definition ("[t]o fail to pay money when it is due") represents a subcategory of the first definition – focusing on failures to do what is required in the context of meeting financial obligations. It offers a common sense meaning of "in default," which would render a person disqualified from participating in a city's government as an appointed official or realizing the benefits of a contract with the city where the person had been determined to owe money to the city. Such financial obligations to a city that would reasonably be encompassed within the term include income taxes, property taxes,3 utility bills, and other liquidated sums.
Consistent with Lansing School District v City of Lansing and the plain and ordinary meaning of the word as used in MCL 117.5, "default" means the failure to fulfill a duty, whether arising from contract or otherwise, that the person owes to the city.
In addition, the statutory language selected by the Legislature – "in default" – makes plain that an "alleged" default or a "challenged" default would not qualify. This is consistent with the rule of statutory construction requiring that meaning be given to each word and prohibiting a court from reading anything into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. Omne Financial, Inc v Shacks, 460 Mich 305, 311; 596 NW2d 591 (1999). Thus, for a person to be "in" default within the meaning of MCL 117.5, the defaulted status must have been fairly determined; it must reflect an actual and uncontested failure to perform an obligation to the city at the point in time that the contract or appointment is to be made or given. Thus, construing the phrase "in default to the city," the defaulter must have been given adequate notice and a reasonable time to cure the default, and the obligation, debt, or payment must not be the subject of a pending court contest or administrative proceeding. See, for example, Golliday v Benton Harbor, 216 BR 407, (Bankr WD Mich 1998) (holding that MCL 117.5(f) could not be enforced by the city council because the debtor’s bankruptcy status overrode the city charter provision which would void the debtor’s election to the city council).4
It is my opinion, therefore, that the phrase "in default to the city" as used in section 5(f) of the Home Rule City Act, 1909 PA 279, MCL 117.5(f), which disqualifies one from receiving a city contract or appointment, means that, at the point in time the contract or appointment is to be made or given, the person has failed to meet a financial, contractual, or other obligation to the city after adequate notice of the obligation and an opportunity to cure it were provided to the person and the obligation is not the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding.
MIKE COX
Attorney General
1 In contrast, under the General Law Village Act, 1895 PA 3, MCL 62.1 et seq, the Legislature has provided that a person in default to the village is not eligible for any office in the village, defining "in default" to mean "delinquent in payment of property taxes or a debt owed to the village" under specified circumstances. MCL 62.7(2).
2 It should be noted that many home rule city charters preclude elected office holders from continuing to hold elective city office if they are in default to the city. See, for example, section 15 of Chapter V of the Fourth Class City Act, MCL 85.15, which serves as the charter of former fourth class cities that became home rule cities on January 1, 1980, pursuant to MCL 81.1c, until those cities adopt their own charter. See also, OAG, 1979-1980, No 5721, p 826 (June 13, 1980), and OAG, 1979-1980, No 5525, p 248 (July 13, 1979).
3 See the General Property Tax Act, MCL 211.47, which was amended by 1988 PA 202 to allow for the seizure and sale of personal property to collect delinquent real property taxes; Detroit v Walker, 445 Mich 682; 520 NW2d 135 (1994), holding that the city was permitted to maintain a personal action against the debtor for collection of unpaid property taxes where such method was not expressly excluded by city charter; and Corrigan v City of Newaygo, 55 F3d 1211 (CA 6, 1995), which dismissed a constitutional challenge to a ballot access ordinance which prevented delinquent taxpayers access to the ballot as candidates.
4 While neither OAG No 120 nor Letter Opinion to Acting City Attorney Hiltunen address the definition of "in default" as that term is used in section 5(f) of the HRCA, to the extent those Opinions could be understood as permitting a person who is in default, as that term is defined in this Opinion, to be eligible for a city contract or office, they are superseded.
http://opinion/datafiles/2010s/op10318.htm
State of Michigan, Department of Attorney General
Last Updated 10/25/2010 09:44:18 |
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Sun Dec 08, 2013 9:10 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Where does the responsibility lie for filing a complaint regarding the debts owed to the city denying the person the right to be a candidate for a city council person?
It may lie with the research of other candidates who must then make a complaint. |
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Sun Dec 08, 2013 9:13 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Some Flint City Council candidates behind on taxes, records show
Kristin Longley | klongley1@mlive.com By Kristin Longley | klongley1@mlive.com
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on June 21, 2009 at 8:00 AM, updated June 21, 2009 at 8:06 AM
FLINT, Michigan -- As the city faces a multimillion-dollar deficit, one in every four people running for the Flint City Council has failed to pay property taxes on time, Genesee County records show.
The City Council handles millions of taxpayer dollars each year, but at least eight candidates -- including two incumbents -- owe a total of nearly $16,000 in back taxes, and some face water liens and property forfeitures, according to a Flint Journal search of delinquent tax information.
Some of the candidates deny owing anything and say they've paid their bills.
The individual amounts range from just $23 to more than $8,000 -- and a few are more than a year overdue, the records show.
In some cases, candidates said personal financial problems led them to fall behind on payments. Others said the information obtained from the county was wrong or someone else's mistake.
Former City Councilman and current 3rd Ward candidate Johnnie Coleman, who owed the least at $23.73, said the overdue payment was an oversight on his part and that he paid it last week.
"I'm not making an excuse for it -- it was my mistake," Coleman said, adding that he believes Flint elected officials should own property in the city and take responsibility for it.
"I think (council members) should be held to a higher standard," he said. "We should pay our taxes on time."
Owing the most is 3rd Ward candidate Quincy Murphy, who said he's making scheduled payments on his $8,145.27 in overdue taxes, property forfeiture penalties and fees. Some of the debt dates to 2006. Murphy is enrolled in a homeowner foreclosure prevention program.
The community activist, who's president of his neighborhood association, said he fell on hard times after being laid off from the University of Michigan-Flint. He said he's unable to find work and spends most of his time volunteering with the Garfield-Bunche community service group and running for office.
Murphy said he considered the effects of his financial problems before running for office but ultimately decided that other down-on-their-luck Flint residents can identify with his situation.
"I'm not alone when it comes to people with delinquent taxes," he said. "I fell in hardship, like a lot of other residents of this city."
Genesee County Treasurer Daniel Kildee said about 12 percent of county residents have delinquent taxes, and the rate in the city is even higher. Some of those people also are in forfeiture, which is the beginning stage of the foreclosure process, he said.
Homeowners enter forfeiture after one year of having delinquent taxes, and the home is foreclosed after 25 months of being delinquent, he said.
With unemployment on the rise and property taxes increasing in most cases, the number of people with delinquent taxes has jumped in the past two years -- and not just in Flint, he said.
"Delinquent taxes seem to be pervasive in every corner of the county," Kildee said. "It's hitting strong and stable areas, where in the past delinquencies were concentrated in the weaker market areas."
But some say City Council members, who set the city budget and handle millions of taxpayer dollars, should take extra care of their personal finances.
The city recently submitted a five-year deficit reduction plan to the state in the face of a $14-million deficit.
The issue of public office candidates with delinquent taxes was recently debated in the village of Holly. Holly is in the process of changing its charter so that a person who owes the village money is ineligible to run for local office.
"Personally, I would have a problem levying taxes on my neighbors knowing I myself owed taxes," village President Pete Clemens said. "It's just a moral question."
Flint resident Richard Smith, 59, who owns a house on Worchester, said candidates should at least make arrangements to pay late taxes before filing for office.
But given the local economic climate, he said he's not surprised at the number of Flint candidates in delinquency.
"It's hard times right now," he said. "General Motors left, and people don't have it like they used to. It's reasonable as long as they're making an effort to pay."
Second Ward Councilwoman Jackie Poplar, who was elected in 2005, said her late taxes stem from when she filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy after her mother died. As a result, her taxes are paid through a third party.
"It was extraordinary circumstances," she said. "It was either go into Chapter 13 or don't bury my mother."
The Journal was unable to reach 3rd Ward Councilman Kerry Nelson, who owes $635.24; 4th Ward candidate Erick Hempel, who owes $2,952.72; and 6th Ward candidate Phillip Thompson were unsuccessful. Thompson's property is owned by Bethlehem Temple Church and has $1,888.49 in delinquent taxes, according to the county Web site.
Hempel also is in forfeiture dating to 2007, county records show.
Longtime Flint real estate agent Dianne Martin, who's running against Poplar in the 2nd Ward, owes $2,157.39, according to the county. But Martin said she has an escrow account on her home, and the mortgage company should have paid the taxes.
"It's out of my hands," she said. "I called my mortgage company once and I'll call them again. This happens frequently (with escrow accounts)."
Fifth Ward candidate Walter Abrams said the information from the county is wrong, and he doesn't owe the $1,396.64 listed in the delinquent taxes database.
"That's a mistake -- I know it's paid," he said. "Everyone should pay their taxes on time."
Dawne Ferguson-Prance, who's running in the 4th Ward, wasn't aware that she has $315.81 in delinquent taxes. She said her husband is in the middle of retiring from General Motors, and they must have fallen behind as they work to get their postretirement finances squared away.
Ferguson-Prance said this is the first time in about 20 years she's had any problems with her personal finances, and it's a sign of the poor economy.
"It's a homeowner's responsibility," she said. "If you've done things the way they should be done all along, that's one thing.
"On the other hand, if you've been a constant deadbeat, then something should be done about it." |
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Sun Dec 08, 2013 9:42 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Best of Detroit
Bill Johnson: Council Hopeful Bernard Parker 'Clearly Not An Eligible Contender'
June 11th, 2013, 6:33 AM
Veteran Detroit political commentator Bill Johnson writes that unresolved campaign finance violations should keep City Council candidate Bernard Parker off the Aug. 6 primary ballot.
The former county commissioner is running in District 4 on Detroit's east side.
[Photo from WDIV]
"Twice this year, Parker was notified by certified mail that he was in violation of the Campaign Finance Act," Johnson writes at his blog under the headline "Give Bernard parker the boot."
On February 6, 2013, . . . Parker received an eight page letter detailing the numerous errors and omissions in his campaign reports. The letter explicitly advised him that failure to resolve these issues would generate a fee of $25 per day up to the maximum fee of $500. Twice he ignored the notices and warning.
Parker, a Wayne County commissioner until the end of 2012, filed for the council race April 30 and signed an affidavit affirming that he had filed or paid "all statements, reports, late filing fees and fines due from me or any candidate committee organized to support my election to office.”
Parker knew at the time he signed this official declaration that he was in violation of the law; that he was ineligible to run for a spot on the city council. . . .
Detroiters should not take lightly Parker’s attempt to ignore or subvert the law. His defiance is indefensible. . . . It shows a new level of contempt for the people he wants to serve. . . .
If Parker stays on the ballot, it will be up to voters to exercise their civic obligation to deal with this abnormality.
Read more: BillJohnsonDetroit.com |
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Mon Dec 09, 2013 5:51 am |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Parker knew at the time he signed this official declaration that he was in violation of the law; that he was ineligible to run for a spot on the city council. . . .
Detroiters should not take lightly Parker’s attempt to ignore or subvert the law. His defiance is indefensible. . . . It shows a new level of contempt for the people he wants to serve. . . .
___________________________________________________________________Mays was confronted over his past campaign finance debt. He also has past due parking tickets that go back to 2000 and there is no statute of limitations on these tickets. He has not paid the fine for his disorderly conduct arrest.
When lobbying city council he was never required to fill out the lobbying forms, which are required under the charter.Mays even lobbied for the tribe to bring a casino to Flint. He advocates for home businesses when his two attempts, soap and water, failed.
To me, Mays preyed on the desire of the north end for political justice and equality. When I watch him in action I see a carnival barker making promises he can't keep..There is a great discontent among many over the decisions made by the Governor and the parade of Emergency Managers that have controlled Flint and I view Mays as preying on that discontent.
He worked with Ed Taylor to have hearings on the Police and he sat on a board to make recommendations. They accomplished nothing but a great expense of funding and a litany of statements without a plan. The NAACP had greater success. |
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Mon Dec 09, 2013 6:11 am |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Water drinkers for Mays
Joe Lawlor | Flint Journal By Joe Lawlor | Flint Journal
Follow on Twitter
on April 17, 2009 at 2:10 PM, updated April 17, 2009 at 2:34 PM
If you drink bottled water in Flint, you could inadvertently be contributing to the Eric Mays for mayor campaign.
In one of the most unusual campaign fundraising ideas I've ever come across, Mays is starting up an Amway-like water distribution campaign.
Either directly or indirectly, those selling and buying Everlasting Pure Natural Spring Water will be putting money into the Mays campaign.
Mays admits that he doesn't know if the tactic jives with campaign finance laws, but he welcomes the questions.
"I want the toughest scrutiny," said Mays, sitting in front of a giant collage of photos of himself that are tinted green and white.
And Genesee County Clerk Michael Carr, who supervises elections in the county, said he doesn't know, either, but he's going to check it out.
"Only Eric could come up with this," Carr said. "He is a very intelligent guy and shouldn't be underestimated."
Here's how it works:
1. Mays created the Watergalore sole proprietership company last year. He has been distributing water for months now.
2. Campaign volunteers can go into the Mays campaign headquarters on South Saginaw Street and pay Mays $12 to sell 10 bottles of water. The suggested retail price is $1.50 per bottle. If you sell 10 bottles, you earn $3 in profit.
3. Watergalore will loan the Mays for Mayor campaign money generated from selling water. He said he may set it up so that the money goes directly into the campaign, rather than first the company and then into the campaign.
4. Just like Amway, there's bonuses for sellers who sign up other sellers and for volume sales.
5. The water is supplied by Andre Muhammad of Flint and is bottled in Memphis, Tenn.
Mays said the idea not only helps his campaign, but helps people in Flint earn money.
We'll see how this shakes out. Say what you will about Mays (and his hour-long diatribes at City Council meetings), but his campaign has been interesting and unorthodox.
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Water drinkers for Mays, final installment
Joe Lawlor | Flint Journal By Joe Lawlor | Flint Journal
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on April 23, 2009 at 11:48 AM, updated April 23, 2009 at 1:53 PM
I promise this is the last installment of the Eric Mays bottled water campaign scheme.
Follow the link to find out the details of the Amway-style campaigning. But the long and short of it is, apparently Mays stumped all of the campaign experts.
According to the folks at the Genesee county elections commission, they didn't know whether it was legal. So they asked the state elections people, and the officials at the state said they weren't touching it unless someone filed a complaint.
Even then, the state officials told the county officials it's unclear whether it's legal or not.
Stuart Bauer/Flint JournalEric Mays at a recent City Council meeting
I also asked a local attorney, and he didn't know off the top of his head.
It sounds like a great topic for a law class somewhere, but for now, Eric can keep having campaign volunteers selling that bottled water.
I'm guessing he won't get an endorsement from the Sierra Club, considering the reputation bottled water has for polluting the environment (too many people don't recycle the plastic bottles).
But if you have the Don's endorsement, what else do you need? |
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